KNOWING THE FEELINGS OF OTHERS :

A USE OF LITERATURE IN MORAL EDUCATION

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Russell Graham OLIVER

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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION

Teachers and curriculum planners have long been aware that literature can play an important part in moral education, although it does not appear that its actual contribution has been very thoroughly articulated in recent years. It is important that this should be done, since the rethinking which has occurred regarding moral education and literary and aesthetic theories has made the traditional assumptions somewhat obsolete. It is clear that one very important feature of what John Wilson calls a "liberal" moral education is that students must learn how to find out what other people are feeling or might feel. This thesis will consider the ways in which we can know how other people feel, and the role which literature might play in the development of the necessary ability.

There tends to be some confusion about the role of knowledge of the feelings of others in moral education, not because anyone doubts its importance, but rather because words with very different meanings are often used loosely. Words such as "empathise" and "sympathise" seem to be freely exchanged with others such as "imagine" and "identify". The problem here is one of confusing "feeling" with "knowing". One of the purposes of this introduction is to distinguish between these two concepts as they contribute to a rational morality.

While moral issues are not restricted to those issues concerning how we ought to behave toward other people, it is true nevertheless that those who wish to unravel the elements

required for a moral education must give considerable attention to the implications of the principle of "concern for other people's interests". We often have difficulties when we try to guide our behaviour by this principle, however, because we so frequently lack sufficient facts to make confident moral judgements. We must know whose interests will be affected by a situation and how they will be affected, and we must know the effects on such interests of any actions we might take. A person's interests may be determined by what is dangerous to him (if he is perhaps too young to judge, or insufficiently knowledgeable in the use of machinery) or they may be determined by what we see as counting as infringements of what we more generally consider to be his human rights (to decide for himself, or to receive equal treatment). But very often a consideration of the interests of others involves consideration of their feelings. "All things being equal" we don't wish to torment or upset people, and are concerned that they feel happy and satisfied. We don't sacrifice one person's safety for another person's peace of mind, but we also endeavour to avoid making one person happy at the expense of the happiness of another. And although concern for a person's feelings seems relatively unimportant next to a concern for life itself, we know that extremes of feeling, such as towering rages or depths of despair, deprive people of their rationality and hence are not only undesirable in themselves but can also be extremely dangerous through removing from them their ability to judge their own best interests. Knowing how other people feel is often essential to deciding their interests and it must be a major concern of the moral educator, since day-to-day moral

issues are much more concerned with the feelings of people than they are with matters of life and death. Once this is acknowledged it is easy to see the force of Ehman's claim that our disputes over moral matters are much more frequently clashes over the nature of the facts of the situation and how they should be interpreted than they are over matters of value and principle.[1] For knowing how people feel or will feel in a particular case is a task of formidable difficulty.

John Wilson divides his description of a rational morality into what he calls "first-order moral principles" such as "other people's interests", and "second-order norms and rules of procedure: things like self-awareness, facing facts, developing imagination". These things he breaks down into a set of moral components, two of which deserve our particular attention, since they are linked psychologically if not logically in a rational morality and their content is liable to be confused.

> (a) PHIL refers to the degree to which one can identify with other people, in the sense of being such that other people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's own. Different PHIL ratings might refer to the degree to which people are able to identify, and also to the range of this ability. Thus some people may identify very highly with, say, other gang-members, and not at all with old ladies: other people may identify very poorly with those of another class or colour, and so forth. (The degree with which one ought to identify in particular situations is of course in question here: but the principle is that one ought to identify sufficiently to think and act in such a way as always to take their interests into account, regarding them as on an equality with oneself.) Like the other components, this is a matter of whether, in principle, one accepts others as equals: not a matter of how far one loves them, feels for them, etc.

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[1] Ehman, R., "Moral Objectivity", Journal of Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, vol. XXVIII, 1967. Page 181.

> (b) EMP refers to awareness or insight into one's own and other people's feelings: i.e., the ability to know what those feelings are and describe them correctly. A distinction might be drawn between self-awareness (AUTEMP) and awareness of others (ALLEMP). EMP does not of course logically imply PHIL, though as a matter of psychological fact it may be that one cannot develop in such a way as to have much EMP without regarding them as equals: but how many such cases exist in practice is a matter for further research. -- Awareness of feelings is logically connected with a person's ability to state correctly what so-and-so feels, and to predict what he would feel, in certain situations.[2]

Such a useful account as Wilson's can serve to establish a "launching pad" for the investigations being undertaken here. Yet some consideration must be given to a problem which often arises when a passage such as this is considered, and this is a puzzle over the contribution of "feeling" to our awareness of others. We need to reaffirm the logical "purity" of the notion of "knowing how other people feel" from certain notions of feeling with respect to others. Knowing how another person feels does not logically entail that we feel anything with them or toward them. Whether we can develop the abilities necessary for such knowing without in fact feeling "for" or "with" other people at some point in certain developmental sequences is another question - one which may be to do with empirical rather than logical matters. Nevertheless, there are some concepts which are akin to "knowing how other people feel" which do require some form of emotional response. One of the difficulties is that certain phrases are treated by some people as though they are synonymous, and as a consequence "feeling" slips in and out of our debates on these topics in a manner which becomes apparent (and confusing) when we try to decide what

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[2] Wilson, J., Williams, N. and Sugarman, B., Introduction to Moral Education, Farmington Trust, 1967. Penguin. Pages 192, 195.

ought to be done in our day-to-day decisions about moral education of children. People speak of "knowing how other people feel", "understanding the feelings of others", "being aware of the feelings of others", "putting ourselves in other people's 'shoes'", or of "sympathising" or "empathising" with them. It should be obvious that the first three of these do not logically require feelings of any sort, and that the last two do - they are responses. The fourth one - "putting oneself in another person's 'place' or his 'shoes'" is ambiguous on its own. In the first place it is not to be taken literally - that would be logically impossible. It could mean "try and feel the sorts of things he must be feeling" or it could mean "try and think out what it would be like (work out the psychological facts of) being in his position".

Some writers, when talking of elements of morality akin to Wilson's EMP, employ the "feeling" concepts. Hare, for example, speaks of "sympathetic imagination".[3] Wilson has, of course, unintentionally encouraged this sort of interpretation of his own concept through the similarity of the term EMP to "empathy", although he has been at pains to point out that it does not mean "sympathy" or any feeling or attitude.[4] But the confusion will continue, not merely because people are often unaware of the logical implications of their language, but also because the place of feeling in these second-order norms and rules of procedure is insufficiently clear. There do seem to be two kinds of contribution which "feelings" are

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[3] Hare, R.M., Freedom and Reason, Oxford University Press, London, 1963. Page 94.

[4] Wilson, J., Moral Thinking, Farmington Trust, 1970. Heinemann. Page 54.

frequently assumed to make (aside from the more legitimate developmental ones). Firstly, feeling "for" or "with" other people may be necessary to our "concern" for others - that perception that we are involved with the trials and tribulations of other people. Secondly, some people seem to feel that one or both of these types of feeling may be logically necessary to our "really" understanding how other people feel. When we "fully understand" how another person feels we perhaps achieve some sort of emotional participation in their experience.

The matter of "concern" is to be found in PHIL - "other people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's own". This is "the degree to which one can identify with other people", but it is "not a matter of how far one loves them, feels for them, etc." It is a matter of principle. Nevertheless, Wilson's use of "identification" has been taken by some of us as suggesting that "feeling with" might be involved.[5] It seems at first sight to be a concept similar to "sympathy" and "empathy" and this possibility deserves closer investigation.

If we hear that the teaching profession is being unjustly attacked in respect of an issue with which we, as ex-teachers, are familiar, we may feel angry because we identify with the teachers. There is a conceptual connection between our anger and our identification in this instance, but to "identify" is not always to "feel". When we identify with teachers, younger brothers or trout fishermen, we assign ourselves to particular social groups. When we say that we identify ourselves with

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[5] Gribble, J. and Oliver, R., "Empathy and Education". Unpublished paper, Universities of Melbourne and Canterbury, 1971. Page 15.

fishermen we are pointing out that we have been through experiences which fishermen characteristically go through: that we believe what fishermen usually believe; value what they value. We know how fishermen tend to think and think in much the same way ourselves. (This need not be the same as identifying ourselves as fishermen, which means that our behaviour fulfils certain criteria which define the act of fishing. Of course, in some definitions these two things come together - some might say that doctors, to be doctors, must be committed to the Hypocratic oath). The fact that we who identify with fishermen may feel "for" or "with" the man whose line is tangled in the trees is not very surprising since by identifying with him we have met some minimal condition of each of these forms of feeling. A person who knows how a fisherman feels will recognise that he is in a frustrating position. The other person must be seen to be in some sort of plight before "sympathy" is possible. If we know how he feels we have also met a necessary condition of "empathy".[6] "Identifying" is not a response, although it may dispose us to certain responses. Thus, when we say that we feel angry because we identify with teachers, we are pointing to a fact, the necessary consequence of which (under certain other conditions) is our anger.

The use of "identify" which is analysed here seems to be the sense in which Wilson employs the term. Thus, "some people may identify very highly with, say, other gang-members, and not at all with old ladies: other people may identify very poorly with those of another class or colour, and so forth". For PHIL, it is essential that "other people's interests

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[6] Ibid. Page 5.

actually count or weigh with one or are accepted as of equal validity to one's own". This is a matter of principle, a cornerstone of a rational morality and essential to a "concern for other people's interests" in such a morality. Elsewhere Wilson notes that "in making moral judgements, we consider other people as being on an equal footing with ourselves: what goes for us goes for them too, and vice versa. Without this, it is suggested, the whole business of morality and interpersonal rules could not get started."[7] Now without considering the obviously difficult question of what it is to treat the interests of people "equally", it is plain that we must care as much for those people whose feelings and interests we don't understand as we do for those whose feelings and interests are quite clear to us. We may identify more readily with gang-members than with old ladies, but this does not mean that, because we do not share the beliefs of old ladies or have the same interests as they do, we can permit these interests, beliefs or feelings to weigh less with us than do those of gang-members. Wilson seems to suggest that the thing to do is to learn to identify with more people, but this is to mix up a principle with a capacity. It would be unreasonable to suggest that we should attempt to identify with all people in respect of all interests. Perhaps we can identify with any man over certain "universal" feelings and interests - the desire for food and shelter or sexual gratification - but we cannot expect the gang-member to identify with old ladies in respect of those beliefs and interests which are confined to old ladies as a

[7] Wilson, J., Williams, N. and Sugarman, B., Introduction to Moral Education. Page 77.

group. Identification is, after all, the capacity to recognise that certain beliefs and interests of ours are shared by other people - it is not merely that the feelings and interests of others are understood. A rational man will surely be unable to identify with the hospital patient's fear that he is being devoured by giant spiders, but he may still need to consider the feelings and interests of such a man. It can be seen, then, that this PHIL component is quite distinct from EMP, which is concerned with knowing how others feel. PHIL is the principle which leads us to embark on the search for the interests of the other: when we "identify" this search is partly complete.

It may be necessary, however, for us to identify with others before this principle can be developed. For us to establish a general principle that "other people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with (us), or are accepted as of equal validity to (our) own", we must first have reached the position of having recognised that at least some specifiable people have the same interests and feelings that we have and that we, as equal members of this class of people, have no special rights by virtue of our membership where these feelings and interests are concerned. The development of this capacity to identify with others may in turn depend upon the assignment of a special status to the human object - the acquisition of the concept of a "person" - and even at some point upon the ability to feel "with" or "for" other people. But these are psychological matters somewhat independent of the nature of the principle itself.

Of course, although our consideration of the contribution

of feelings to PHIL must be confined to the sorts of matters considered above, a full analysis could not end there. The principle involves some sort of caring - people's feelings and interests must "count" or "weigh" with one. This caring is a matter of principle and as such is not unlike "caring" for truth or adequate evidence - rational passions which are not directly called out between particular individuals as are feelings "for" or feelings "with". They are matters of principle which are held autonomously in a developed rationality.

The second possible contribution of feelings to components of this sort might arise from a common assumption that we do not "really" know how another feels unless we feel something somewhat akin to what is being felt by the other person. "Empathy" is seen as occasioning some special form of knowledge, although it is always unclear what this might be. In practice, of course, it is rather interesting that when we approach a person who claims to empathise or sympathise we are tolerant of a considerable latitude in respect of the kinds of things which he might be feeling, but we do tend to show some concern over whatever knowledge claims are involved. If a friend says that he sympathises with another person's plight or his anguish it is true that we do not deny that he feels sympathy if we discover that the other person is not in a plight or anguished, but we consider the sympathy mistaken or foolish. If our friend claims to empathise with another's anger and we find that the person <u>is</u> angry, but in respect of an event of which our friend has no knowledge whatever, we will reject the claim to empathise. We do not demand that, for A to empathise with B he must sweat if B sweats or blush if B blushes. We merely

require him to feel something "somewhat akin" to what B is feeling, and considerable latitude is allowed. A wide range of feelings seem to come under the very general notion of "sympathy" - "sorrow", "compassion", "pity" or "concern" all seem acceptable. We look askance at someone who is unmoved by the trials of another and see this as symptomatic of either a failure to care about the feelings of this person (he is callous) or of a failure to possess sufficient facts about the state of the feelings of the other. We do not believe that his failure to be moved results in a lack of knowledge but rather the reverse (given that he holds PHIL).

When people claim that "we do not <u>really</u> understand how they feel" they often mean that our behaviour would be different if we did. Sometimes it is suggested that "if we had ever experienced it we would really <u>know</u>". The "feeling" idea might enter when people consider such things, since when we recall horrible, frustrating or embarrassing experiences our horror, frustration or embarrassment sometimes returns. But it is clear that possession of these feelings does not contribute to our knowledge of the other person's experience (except in so far as they serve to remind us of what we once felt) and the intrusion of the ideas of feeling "with" and feeling "for" can only serve to blind us to the important contribution of particular experiences to <u>really</u> understanding. Feelings which we do have are important, of course, for we can only know what another person feels in terms of an analogy with something we have felt ourselves at sometime or other. But when we attempt to know what another person is feeling in a particular instance we do not <u>necessarily</u> need to feel anything in order to be

successful.

Our conceptions of feelings are limited by our experiences of feeling. A person who has never "known fear" may be able to give a factual account of the types of observable behaviour shown by those who are said to fear, and he may be able to indicate, as a consequence of what others have told him, the sensations of people who are in the grip of fear - those sensations which he has experienced in other contexts. But he will not know what it means to value things in such a way that fear will result when the valued things are threatened. Similarly, there are certain sensations which are too far divorced from any we have experienced to enable us to employ any sort of analogy in order to reach an understanding. For a man to really understand what birth pains are like; for a young person who has led a life free of serious pain to understand the sensations involved in terminal cancer; the necessary experiences are inaccessible. In the absence of experience, our knowledge of feelings is limited to the externally observable and causal, and must fail to be knowledge of mental states as we might otherwise be able to understand them.

Clearly, if there is a need to see the mental states of others as being analogous to our own in order that we <u>really</u> understand, our EMP and PHIL interests are likely to coincide at some point. Wilson points out that "EMP does not of course logically imply PHIL, although as a matter of psychological fact it may be that one cannot develop in such a way as to have much EMP without regarding them as equals: but how many such cases exist in practice is a matter for further research". The necessary "analogy" is a matter of psychological equivalence

rather than moral equality with respect to interests, but the general point still stands, for it depends upon the recognition of the self and other as equally human. Thus the development of both of these components depends upon the acquisition of certain common concepts. If literature can assist students to understand otherwise unintelligible emotional states by picking out important elements and enabling them to draw analogies they otherwise would not have considered, then it will play a part in the attainment of PHIL as well as in the development of the ability to work out how others feel. The concern of this thesis is, however, with the use of literature to develop the latter alone.

It is not difficult to accept the claim that literature can help to develop the ability to work out the feelings of others. Further analysis is needed, however, before we will be able to come to terms with the task of capitalising on this fact in educational programs, for a number of questions begin to arise as soon as we begin to look at the claim more closely. In the first place we must consider whether such a use of literature is incompatible with a literary education. To answer this question we will need to consider what is involved in coming to know how another person feels, and try to ascertain whether the use of these procedures to understand characters in literature is detrimental to the interests of literary study. The position being defended in this thesis is that some of the procedures we wish to develop for a moral education are not only compatible with literary study, but are in fact necessary parts of a critic's repertoire. A further question we might wish to consider is whether or not <u>all</u> literature is valuable

for this purpose. It may be the case that some is of no use, or that particular pieces of literature are of use for particular aspects of the procedures only. And finally, we might wish, of course, to consider the extent to which particular pieces of literature are of value to particular students. It will not be possible to give answers to all these complex questions here. This thesis is essentially a "ground clearing exercise" - a preliminary analysis which, it is hoped, will enable us to point out the directions in which more complete answers can be sought.

The first step will be to consider the various kinds of feelings which other people might have: to consider the logical characteristics of these feelings and the kinds of demands and limitations they impose upon our attempts to understand them. We will then investigate the kinds of procedures we must employ when we attempt to cope with the differences between our own experiences and the experiences of others. The sources of the facts upon which we employ these procedures will be discussed in Chapter IV, and an example from literature will be used to demonstrate how these facts and procedures can be used to gain an understanding of the feelings of a character in fiction. Chapter V will be concerned with the nature of literature. It will be argued that our experience of art is not merely linked to the world, but that part of the value of art arises out of the valued changes in our perception of the world which art facilitates. In addition, it will be held that many of these valued experiences, particularly in works of literature, are of an ethical nature which requires, in many cases, that the emotional experiences of the characters be made apparent to us

as they might appear in real life. There are, however, some difficulties imposed by the ethical demands of these works and by the artistic necessity of constructing an object which is to be experienced. The final chapter will draw the threads of these arguments together and indicate general answers to the questions posed above.

Something needs to be said about the use of "knowing" in "knowing how other people feel". We are concerned here with a task sense of "knowing" - with an attempt to see how we can best satisfy the evidence condition of the concept of "knowledge". "Knowing how other people feel" is used in preference to "'insight into' or 'awareness of' the feelings of others" in order that we remain conscious of the need for a sound evidential basis for our beliefs concerning other people's feelings. It is recognised, however, that the logical problems of producing such evidence is a central issue in the philosophy of mind. We must acknowledge therefore that our use of "know" in this context is very much a "weak sense". But it is nevertheless a legitimate use, without which much of moral philosophy and practical affairs would not be possible.

CHAPTER II : THE LANGUAGE OF FEELING

We must attempt to make a clear distinction between "sensations", which are felt as "twinges", "sinkings", "tickles", "flushes" and "throbs", and those events which we call "emotions".[8] Although these are experienced partly as sensations when we are in the grip of them, they are characterised by causes arising from perceived events. Unlike the causes of sensations, the causes of emotions are made up at least in part by our beliefs and values. These causes are not limited to such things as bad digestion, hard seats, flesh damaged by kitchen doors or creeping diseases. Emotions must occur directly as a consequence of thoughts which have arisen, events we have observed, or things we otherwise have knowledge of as a result of having sensed them and about which we believe certain things.

This distinction is not crystal clear in ordinary language once we depart from central cases. We experience states such as moods which may be the product of certain events about which we have certain beliefs - the noisy class may put us in a bad mood because we believe that it should not be noisy but seem unable to do anything about it - or they may be produced by a run-down physical condition, a refreshing breeze, or drugs. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between feelings which are caused at least partially by beliefs and values and those which are not, for these two kinds of causes make different demands with respect to our understanding when we attempt to

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[8] White, A.R., The Philosophy of Mind, Random House, New York, 1967. Pages 110, 124.

work out how others feel.

I Sensations

When we feel an "itch", "twinge", "tickle" or "pain", it is not an object such as a feather or a pin which we feel, but a sensation. We may also feel the feather which caresses us, but feeling the tickle is not the same as feeling the feather. Sensations are frequently "hallmarked" with a particular location in our body, even when we no longer have that part of the body, as when a soldier might feel his toe itching or burning after he has lost his leg. Knowledge of the location of a sensation need not tell us anything about its cause, although doctors might find certain pains as being symptomatic of certain cause-effect relationships.[9]

The moral relevance of a knowledge of the sensations others feel arises from the necessity of promoting the well-being of others - of alleviating their suffering or "defusing" situations which might cause people to have unpleasant experiences. The point is related to, although not quite the same as the avoidance of actions which might impair someone's health. Laboratory experiments in which subjects undergo painful electric shocks may still provoke an outcry on moral grounds even when it has been shown that no permanent injury will result. In addition (as will be discussed in more detail later), although having a sensation is not a necessary condition of having an emotion it is sometimes symptomatic. "My heart sank" and "I had a lump in my throat" are expressions which sometimes indicate sensations and (very probably) emotions as well.

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[9] Ibid. Page 111.

We acquire knowledge of other people's sensations from what we are told, from postural and facial expressions (winces, grimaces, laughter, "eyes-lighting-up") and from certain other physiological changes such as pallor, deep breathing and sweating. All of this evidence is more or less subject to falsification due to lying or pretending: wincing more so than pallor for example. People can steel themselves to avoid showing pain. This same problem exists with regard to the emotions themselves, but it is less of a problem in both cases if we know the person well.

Judging whether other people feel the same sensations that we feel is not easy, although perhaps not as difficult as assessing emotions. We all have considerable evidence of individual variability in respect of these feelings - other people feel too hot or too cold when we feel quite comfortable. In many instances a certain amount of experience of physiological matters is required - some particularly unpleasant-looking wounds and diseases are relatively painless. Certain emotional states can "blot out" sensations which would otherwise be felt strongly. Men intent on particular tasks live through situations or experience wounds without feeling any particular sensations when we would normally expect them to be in some pain. A considerable amount of information about the experiences of different people in a wide range of situations is necessary if we are to have some idea of what to expect: information from the medical sciences and anecdotal information from literature as well as from everyday life may be valuable. In addition, our ability to tell how someone feels may depend on how well we know him - whether he feels the cold, is sensitive to pain or is

ticklish may, on occasion, be relevant.

We face formidable difficulties in our efforts to "understand" when there is a considerable gap between the sensations the other person is experiencing and the sensations we have known. It is sometimes logically impossible (as in the case of a man and birth pains) and at others practically undesirable (as in the case of extreme agonies) for us to seek the necessary experience. And there is no way comparable to the reconstruction of another person's point of view which will help us to close this gap as we can where emotions are concerned. There are behavioural clues which will help us to tell that the pain is very bad or the pleasant sensation very pleasant and we can often be guided to the location of the sensation if it has a specific location. But these bits of information do not take us very far toward understanding what the sensation is like. We must depend upon the other person reporting his experience by making the analogy for us in terms of things we have felt. "It feels like -", or "it's as if this, and this, and this were happening". The experience must be reconstructed piecemeal in this fashion, and any pieces which are missed out, or for which an analogy is not found, cannot be filled in by the imagination. There is no "logic" to sensations, the unravelling of which will permit us to understand what it is like to feel something very different from anything we have previously felt. The beliefs and values which structure emotions may not be rational, but at least they have a coherence which enables such investigations to increase our understanding.[10] Works of literature often employ metaphor and simile to draw attention to

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[10] See Chapter III. Page 42.

such analogies in detailed descriptions of the sensations accompanying many experiences. In this way they provide access to a knowledge of "what it is like" which would not otherwise be very readily available to us since our knowledge of these experiences of other people depends very much on their verbal ability.

Our capacity to understand what it is like to experience the sensations which other people experience, dependent as this is upon the things we have felt in the past, is very much a limiting factor in our attempts to understand the emotions of others, for no matter how successful we may be in reconstructing their manner of perceiving a situation, we will be limited by this factor when we attempt to understand what it might be to be "in the grip" of the emotion - a matter largely of being swept by sensations. "Emotion" and "sensation" are not two exclusive categories, and it is important to give some attention to the relationship between them.

To be angry we do not have to be feeling any particular sensations all of the time or at any particular time. George Pitcher draws a distinction between what he calls "dispositional" and "occurrent" emotions.[11] John, we may say, is furious with his boss - has been all week, and will be for some time to come. Our friend might counter that John seemed very mild-mannered and even-tempered when we spoke to him a moment ago. "Ah", we might reply, "but his boss wasn't mentioned in the conversation, was he?" We would predict a furious outburst from John if his attention were directed to his boss. John

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[11] Pitcher, G., "Emotion", Mind, vol. LXXIV, 1965. Page 332.

has been, and will continue to be, "disposed" to this fury. The "occurrent" emotion is the outburst; the emotion which is felt. Clearly one need not feel any particular sensation when one is disposed to feeling a certain thing as opposed to actually feeling it. Characteristically, when we feel occurrent fear our heart races, we feel weak at the knees, our heart seems to sink, our scalp tingles and we perspire but are cold. When we are embarrassed we blush, and when we are angry our face burns and we sometimes tremble. Particular sensations are not conceptually linked to particular emotions, but when we have an emotion occurrently we must feel some combination of sensations.

II Emotions

The feelings which we shall call "emotions" are linked with matters of perception which can be considered as forming a distinctive class of causes. A student is in a very great state of fear which has been caused largely by L.S.D. But his fear is also intimately bound up with the clock on the table from which he is shrinking. There are difficulties with this kind of example, of course. If we are to demonstrate that we have located the object of his fear it must be possible for us to show that the student believes at the time that there are good reasons for viewing the presence of the clock as some sort of threat. It is his reaction to the clock which leads us to describe his behaviour as fearful, and the description is logically linked to the way he sees the clock at this moment. Hirst and Peters talk of this element - a cognitive element of emotion - as "appraisal".

To feel fear, for instance, is to see a situation as

> dangerous, to feel pride is to see with pleasure something as ours or as something that we have had a hand in bringing about. Envy is connected with seeing someone else as possessing something or someone to which or whom we think we have a right, and so on. The appraisal in each case has a feeling side to it. If fear is felt, seeing something as dangerous is different from seeing it as three feet high or as green, in that it is non-neutral.[12]

Pitcher speaks of apprehension, or misapprehension of the object of emotion. He suggests that inclinations, wants, desires and beliefs underly emotions and that they have a more than empirical link to a form of positive or negative evaluation which characterises emotional behaviour. His use of "apprehension" and "evaluation" seems very similar to Hirst and Peters' use of "appraisal".

> The term "evaluation", as I am using it, is not meant to suggest that the person must make an evaluational judgement, or even that he must have what might be called an evaluational belief. Sometimes the evaluation will be constituted by a conscious judgement or by a belief or assumption, but sometimes not. For example, if Q slaps P in the face, and P becomes angry at this, one would not want to say that P judges Q's action was a bad thing or even that he believes it to be. He may only angrily strike Q in return. Still, one wants to say something about P's attitude to Q's act in the evaluational dimension: and whatever the most appropriate locution might be in this case, I think it not wholly unnatural to say, as I do, that it will designate a species of negative emotion.[13]

Most of us would want to say more than Pitcher seems prepared to say, however. The striking of Q is evidence of the anger but in itself it gives no clue to the "angry" description, except empirically (Ps who strike Qs in such circumstances usually do so because they are angry). We must be able to say something about how P is perceiving the situation before we can

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[12] Hirst, P.H. and Peters, R.S., The Logic of Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970. Page 49.

[13] Pitcher, G., op.cit. Page 334.

describe his response as "angry". P cannot believe, for example, that Q's slap was an affectionate pat. We must be able to say certain things about P's beliefs - that he believes the slap to be an attack or an affront. Pitcher's own account suggests this when he argues that we can judge emotions in terms of their rationality. Presumably the beliefs which constitute the appraisal are the things which we judge.

A feature of some of these appraisals which must receive some attention might generally be called their "focus". Usually it is said that central cases of emotions such as anger, jealousy, love, hate and fear are "directed toward an object", a description which must be distinguished from "caused by" (something), although it is not always ruled out that an "object" can be a "cause". The sense in which emotions have these "objects" is the subject of considerable debate. Gosling has argued that attention paid to prepositions in statements such as "John is angry with Jim" provides only a poor test for identifying objects of emotion since this alone might be compatible with more than one object (John is angry about X). The "must" entailment suggested by the assertion that John must be angry about something does not carry us very far. He also points out that the "target" metaphor employed by Wittgenstein (the emotion being directed toward something) works better for some emotions than it does for others - "anger" and "gratitude" as opposed to "fear" and "shame" for example.

He also shows that the concept of the "object" itself may introduce confusing elements into the discussion. Any of three senses may be involved.

> First there is the simple grammatical sense: the object governed by verb or preposition. Second there is the physical object sense; and third, there is the "object of concern" sense - -.
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> These senses may, however, part company, causing uncertainty in such cases as pride. If I feel proud of my house it is tempting to think of the house as the object of my pride, partly because it is what the preposition governs and partly because it is a relevant object. Yet there is an attraction in Hume's view that pride is directed towards oneself and one's own reputation; it is my own reputation, not my house, that I have mainly in mind when I am proud of my house. That is the real object of pride, the objective of the proud man. His concern is always with his own name.[14]

Attempts to establish a criterion which will distinguish between statements linking an emotion with its object from those linking it to a cause which is not the object have proved to be generally unsatisfactory. It is important for our task that some useful progress be made in this respect for it is clear that however the difference is actually formulated, there <u>is</u> an important difference in the structure of the appraisal and the relationship between the appraisal and the emotion when emotions which have objects are compared with those which do not. Some knowledge of the object is necessary before many emotions can be identified. This does not mean that the object must be a particular kind of thing, but it must be something which can be viewed in a particular way. Thus, for fear it must be capable of being seen as a threat, for gratitude it must be possible to see it as a source of unlooked for aid. Emotions which do not have objects may be caused by appraisals, but are not logically dependent upon them. The news of the world over the last week may depress us, the sunny weather and the Spring clothes may make us feel elated or joyful, but such feelings need not be

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[14] Gosling, J.C., "Emotion and Object", <u>Philosophical Review</u>, vol. LXXIV, 1965. Page 489.

determined by our perceptions at all. Drugs might be enough. And although drugs may also cause fear, we still will not call the emotion fear unless we can locate the object except in special cases. The special cases are, like "intuitive knowledge", qualified to show that a condition is withdrawn as in "fear of I-knew-not-what" or "unknown dreads".

It is easy enough, of course, to suggest that the present approach to analysing the concept of the "object" of an emotion is unsatisfactory, but more difficult to indicate a more fruitful line of attack. One approach is to point out how different emotions are one from the other and suggest that many individual solutions will be needed. Another approach might be to argue that more account must be taken of the situation within which the object is embedded. Let us pursue the "focus" analogy and suppose, for example, that a man is confronting us with a gun and we are scared. Clearly we would ordinarily say that the object of our fear is the man with the gun. The "threat" is the threat to our life or the threat of injury. We see the man with the gun as a threat because a lot of things seem quite probable - the gun "might" be loaded, the man "might" intend to shoot us or frighten us or he "might" be careless. He "might" pull the trigger. The bullet "might" hit us, and hence injure or wound us. The only reason we name the man as the object is that he is the physically present "focus" of these considerations. He "represents" a situation waiting for a cause to set off a chain of harmful events. We fear possible or probable consequences of events not occurrent events themselves. The loading of the gun, the pulling of the trigger, the hitting of the bullet, the death, are possible outcomes of

the situation "man-pointing-a-gun-at-us". If we are concerned to pick out as the object the elements of the occurrent situation which make it more or less probable that this chain of events will occur then we should attend to such things as the man's intentions or his dispositions, or perhaps his quivering trigger finger. Our ordinary language specification of the object of the emotion as "the man with the gun" would, on this view, need to be seen as defining the rough location of the object. And it seems probable that most of us would agree that this is a case in which the object of the emotion has been clearly identified.

But what would we want to say about a farmer who fears that rain will ruin his grain before it is harvested? His grain is ripe but will take some days to harvest. If it rains before the crop is in it will sprout and be ruined. This would be very serious for him since one poor crop will force him to abandon the farm. He shows his fear by cajoling, harassing and overemploying workers, and by paying them more generously than usual. He has sleepless nights and goes pale and grits his teeth when anyone mentions rain. No one would deny that such a man is afraid, and all would agree that his is not an object-less fear, but that the object is to be found in the situation which has arisen - that his grain crop is vulnerable to rain. The ordinary language locution we would look to for the object would be "the farmer fears rain" or "fears that it will rain" or something of the sort. In that the chain of harmful events would be set in motion by whatever causes rain, we would expect the object to be the occurrent disposition of the climate with respect to rain. Even if there is not a cloud in the sky he

must feel he has some reason to suspect that such a disposition might exist, just as we felt we had reason to expect a trigger-pulling disposition in the man with the gun - the climate may merely be somewhat unpredictable for this condition to be met. How much evidence of rain he needs before the possibility becomes one for him to fear may depend upon the seriousness with which he views the vulnerability of the crop. In this case then, to fear rain is similar to fearing the flying bullet - a possible future event which might not occur. The rain does not exist and might never exist. And we do not fear probabilities as such but the potential outcomes of present states of affairs. Such a case would be similar to saying that a man walking at night in a dangerous and poorly policed neighbourhood fears flying bullets when there are no flying bullets but some reason to believe that he might yet be accosted by an armed robber. "Fears rain", or "that it will rain" are very much more crude specifications of the object than "the man with the gun", but this is not surprising since it would otherwise be a complicated climatological matter to specify the locus of the object more precisely. This is the limitation of such ordinary language descriptions. When we ask what the farmer fears we want to understand the "focus" of his activity and his obvious distress. We do not want a detailed account of the mechanics of the local weather - our everyday demand is merely to be pointed in the right direction. And this description suffices. But it might still appropriately be used of our farmer if black clouds were massing on the horizon, although the situation would no longer be the same - his appraisal would be different as would the more precise specification of the object. It is thus misleading to

attempt to find criteria for identifying the objects of emotions from the grammar of such simple everyday descriptions. We are likely to be led to such patently false positions as the one outlined by J.R.S. Wilson when he says that "some would say that fear or hope that something will be the case are not properly speaking emotions. It certainly sounds odd to say that someone who is afraid that it is going to rain, or fears that the budget will be tough this year, is feeling an emotion". He comes to this conclusion because he does not want to extend the use of "object" to cover cases which relate to possible future events. We can see that such a conclusion arises from insufficient attention to the situations in which such emotions arise.[15]

Although it is not possible to give a clear account of "objects" of emotions at this time, what we have somewhat crudely termed the "focus" of an emotion is of considerable importance to our interests. For clearly, knowledge of whether or not an emotion has an object, or what the object is if it has one, will have a bearing on decisions as to what action should be taken in the interests of others. Knowing that the man has been disarmed, or that he is not disposed to fire the gun, or that it is not loaded would each serve to alleviate our distress. Helping to get the harvest in quickly will help to relieve the farmer. But in the case of objectless emotions our knowledge of any of the elements of the appraisal which caused the emotion may not directly assist us in deciding how we should act to reduce distress. If our friend is depressed

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[15] Wilson, J.R.S., Emotion and Object, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972. Page 58.

today because, through coming to work by an unusual route he passed along a street of ugly buildings, we might not change his mood by having the buildings demolished or erasing them from his memory (he may have forgotten all about the buildings and may "just be depressed"). We may be forced instead to consider quite unrelated things - things which will cheer him up.

Even if it were not sometimes very difficult to locate the precise object of any particular emotion, it would be clear that there are factors external to the particular appraisal which can increase the difficulty of the task of locating the object. We are, for example, liable to confuse the object of an emotion with the object of its expression. When we see a man angrily kicking a tin can we are unlikely to pick out the can as the object of his anger. There will be other times when the object of the emotion will be the same as the object of expression (P strikes Q). But there will also be many cases where the objects, though different, will not be obviously different, and we may be led to misunderstand the nature of the other person's emotion because of this.

Another situation which makes locating the objects of emotions difficult is when more than one emotion arises out of one set of circumstances. We may be thrilled at the prospect of winning a lot of money but fear that we will lose some of our friends as a result. We may look forward eagerly to our chance to excel in front of our peers but also be afraid of looking ridiculous. Locating the different objects in such cases can be quite a difficult business, particularly if there are many emotions intricately intermeshed. Ryle called such

states when feelings pull against each other "agitations", and it is clear that such "mixed feelings" are commonly present in cases where we have trouble understanding what another person is feeling.[16]

We have little difficulty identifying the typical structure of the appraisals of a large range of central cases of most feelings. We know the general emotion which will arise in an ordinary man who is placed without protection in a cage of hungry lions, or has the noose lowered around his neck in preparation for the hanging. We do not need to have had these experiences to be able to say something specific about the intensity of the emotion or the sensations involved, since we all recognise these as fear-evoking situations. When people do not feel fear in these circumstances they provide us with "special cases" - their behaviour calls for explanation. The same applies to sensations. We know that putting a hand in the fire will cause pain, that dried leaves down the neck will itch, that soles of the feet which are stroked with a feather will tickle. These are central cases: to fail to understand them is to be unable to use correctly some of the language concerned with feeling. Such cases are central to the basic vocabulary of feeling words - and the association between case and emotion is usually made in early childhood. What is not learned early - what is, in fact our constant problem of knowledge, is how to cope with variability between people. Our central cases are simple. Most people would feel alike in these situations described above. But how do we cope with

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[16] Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Peregrine, 1963. Page 90.

situations where people might be expected to differ in their feelings? The problem is to know what will function as a cause for a particular feeling in any one person.

The matter of working out how other people appraise a situation (which is, after all, fundamental to working out what emotion a person will feel) will depend either on our being able to assume a common set of relevant values and beliefs or on the knowledge we have of the values and beliefs which constitute the other person's form of life. But it must be remembered that these kinds of information will contribute to our knowledge of his appraisal only - we will know some of the factors which will cause the person to appraise a situation in a particular way but this may not constitute a complete specification of the causes of his emotion. John may be angry with us for using his pen without his permission. His appraisal may be based on certain beliefs he has about the way people ought to behave and about property rights. But it may be the case that where we are concerned this would usually not result in anger since we are good friends. On this occasion, however, he is in an irritable mood which contributes to his appraisal. The mood itself is one that does not involve an appraisal - it is a product of late nights, bad food and a lumpy bed. As we move away from appraisals the explanation of the feelings ceases to involve values and beliefs, but rather depends on medical and physiological knowledge and their everyday equivalents for an understanding of causation.

Two main interests may control our attempts to understand the emotions and sensations experienced by others. We may wish to understand what it is that they are experiencing now, or we may

want to predict what they will be feeling in the future. The first case is easier, for we have the evidence of the person's occurrent behaviour against which to check our attempts to reconstruct his feelings from knowledge we have gained through past experience. Prediction is more difficult because of the absence of this possibility of verification. It is however an extremely important task from the moral point of view, since we must frequently attempt to discover whether actions we might take will be to the detriment of others. In addition, many features of the problem of prediction can be present in occurrent situations when people succeed in hiding their feelings from us by acting or lying. This throws us entirely upon our past experience and, where emotions are involved, upon our ability to reconstruct the other person's point of view. The task of such reconstruction will be the concern of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III : THE TASK OF KNOWING

The point has already been made that people differ over the things which function as the objects of their emotions and the things which serve to cause them. The analogy between our feelings and their expression and the feelings and expressions of other people provides only the base point. Since it is not inevitable that a feeling be expressed, and because more than one form of expression is often possible, various bits of behaviour are not of necessity tied to particular feelings. People can express their feelings in different ways. Consequently the relationship between feeling and expression may not be the same in other people as it is in ourselves on any occasion due to differences of biology, personality and cultural expectations. The basic analogy between ourselves and others permits communication as well as the public assessment of knowledge claims. But if we depend upon this analogy to the extent that we fail to take account of the point at which it breaks down - and hence do not take account of the differences between ourselves and others in terms of both the expression and causation of feelings - we will be unable to do more than project our own feelings in situations where we wish to know. It is difficult for children to understand adult love, because they fail to appreciate the force of the differences between adults and themselves. A man who wishes to understand how a woman feels throughout menarche or menopause will not only have to take cognizance of the physical differences (and an understanding of the effects of these on feeling may, of course, be impossible) but of the cultural ones as well. It should be clear that the

capacity to cope with the differences between ourselves and others when we wish to know how they feel depends on our knowledge of these differences and our success at predicting their effects. This capacity is learned in part through the force of certain experiences which we have had in confrontations with other people and through reliable authorities of many kinds who have done the experiencing, sifted and weighed the evidence for us.

Since we do not have direct access to the minds of other people we must draw inferences about their emotional states from our observations of their behaviour and the situations in which particular behaviours arise. The relationship between our own feelings and behaviour is relatively clear to us. We know that when we happen to be blushing it is also quite likely that we will be seeing events in such a way as to be embarrassed by them. We know that our pallor, perspiration and shaky retreat accompanies our fear. When we see another person pale, perspiring and retreating we know that, although this behaviour may indicate various things with different degrees of probability, fear is one of the things which are highly probable. This collection of events which we attach to a particular emotion concept, and which we use not only to infer the presence of the emotion, but also the locus of the object, the structure of the appraisal and the existence of any other causes, shall be called an "interpretive scheme". With the passing of time we learn more about different causes of emotion, different structures of belief and different social conventions, any of which may determine the occurrence of a feeling and its expression in behaviour.

The limits of an interpretive scheme are marked out by the rules governing the logic of the emotion concept. Events are not part of the scheme if they are not seen as related either logically or contingently to some feature of these rules. If X hits Y with whom he is angry, the focus of his attention toward Y is logically related to the fact that Y is the object of his anger. The fact that X's face is flushed is only contingently related, however, dependent as this is upon certain physiological dispositions.

The interpretive scheme is not structured merely as a collection of events, but as a collection of events which "indicate" something about the emotion, either by permitting us to pick out causes of behaviour or beliefs and rules governing such things as perceptions. These events which fall under a scheme need not be limited to pieces of behaviour occurrently exhibited by a person feeling an emotion. They may be pieces of behaviour in the past which indicated the presence of certain beliefs. And they are not events strictly limited to the behaviour of the individual but will often include features of the situation in which the behaviour occurred. Thus the scheme, as it becomes more elaborated, consists of more sophisticated beliefs about the ways in which people demonstrate what they believe by the ways in which they behave, and how their beliefs structure into appraisals and modify the expression of emotions akin to ones we have felt, though the beliefs are different from those we hold and the situation is different from anything we have confronted. And further, the scheme shows us the conditions under which other relevant dispositions change to contribute to an emotion.

When we are asked to substantiate a claim to know how another person feels it may be appropriate to give the immediate facts upon which the claim is based. How do you know he was angry? Well, he was red in the face, shouting, thumping the table, throwing ornaments across the room. These kinds of facts assume an interpretive scheme which will be understood by both the person making the claim and the person who is asking for the claim to be supported. But the person making the request may, of course, be asking for the interpretive scheme itself to be spelled out. "How do you know he was angry?" - may mean "show me how it is that these pieces of behaviour should correctly be interpreted as 'angry'". The analogy between our feelings and those of other people is logically prior to any answer to such a question. Thus, there will be facts about our feelings in certain situations. Upon these will be built facts concerning the ways in which our appraisals of a given situation would be modified if our beliefs were different in specifiable ways.

If answering the question involves us in presenting the immediate facts, then the validity of our claim depends upon our reliability as observers - as instruments for recording facts - since in this case the interpretive scheme is assumed. If answering the question involves us in spelling out the interpretive scheme, however, we will be involved in showing that our beliefs are rational.

Q 1 How do you know he is angry?

A He is shouting.

Q 2 But how do you know he is <u>angry</u>?

A Most men are angry when they shout like that.

To be able to answer 1, one must be able to point to a particular fact (shouting man) and invoke 2. To learn 2 is a complicated feat. A very simple way of explaining how we learn 2 would be to say that it is an inductive matter. We learn that most men are angry when they shout like that from the sheer number of occasions when we shouted when we felt angry, and from the weight of instances when we have seen men shout when they were (for other reasons obvious to us at the time) clearly angry. But we cannot, by this means, establish the truth of our belief that, as a rule, men are angry when they shout like that. Nothing much hangs on the repetition of instances.[17] Once it occurs to us that our shout is linked to our anger, repeated instances can tell us nothing new, and it is possible that the conjecture may be made after the first instance. Much of our learning is, of course, like this. We usually need only one instance to see the relationship between the burnt finger and the fire. To see the value of the generalisation its limits must be tested by seeing where it doesn't apply to our own behaviour or the behaviour of others. Where we note, for example, that an obviously angry man makes no sound while he is in church, we have a case through which, by investigating the facts, we may be able to modify our belief about the rules governing his behaviour and acquire a new one. We may find, for example, that beliefs about appropriate behaviour in church modify his otherwise predictable disposition to express anger by shouting. The point is that, although repeated cases may be needed before we see that the two factors are related, the

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[17] Popper, K., Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963. Page 46.

beliefs built into the various interpretive schemes need not be based on more than one instance - perhaps someone pointed out the relationship between these sets of beliefs, and this was enough to establish it in our scheme.

In order to cope with the differences between the way we feel in a given situation and the way another person might feel we need to have experienced a wide range of emotions and achieved some degree of self-understanding. We also need a considerable body of facts about other people. Of the myriad facts available to us only a relatively few are selected to support our belief that a person is feeling or will feel a certain thing. This selection is in accord with certain principles which are derived from our own emotional lives, and from our knowledge of the way certain sets of beliefs cohere into systems. The whole business of the selecting and the fitting of these facts into a particular interpretive scheme must, however, conform to certain rational procedures if the claim to know how another person feels is to be supported. It must, in principle, be possible for any rational man to return to the initial observations and verify the interpretations.

The problem with this task is the matter of coming to terms with the differences between ourselves and others. This is not merely a matter of recognising when other people are expressing or indicating emotions in ways which are foreign to our own modes of behaviour or patterns of responses, but also a matter of recognising that certain events will cause certain emotional states to occur in other people when these same events would not act as causes or would cause different kinds of emotion in ourselves. In addition, to perform the task we would need

to work out the effects of specific events in specific cases. This chapter will be concerned with the procedures involved in "working the calculus": of putting oneself in another person's place.

The argument thus far has been an attempt to show that our knowledge of other people's emotional states depends upon the assumption that what they are feeling when they exhibit certain pieces of observable behaviour is analogous to what we feel when we behave in similar ways. This point is logically bound up with the assumption that human behaviour can be explained in terms of certain consistencies. For another person's behaviour to be intelligible then we must reconstruct his point of view in the light of experiences we have had.

I Imagination

To construct another person's way of appraising a particular situation we must neutralise our own way of viewing it and correctly construct another appraisal. We must, firstly, recognise that there is a disparity between our view and the view of another, and to have done this is of course to have constructed a new view. To make such a "recognition" is to cease to be dominated by our own perceptions. We now believe that there are other ways of viewing the facts. This is a matter of seeing the effects of our prejudices and values upon our appraisals. In developmental terms, Piaget discusses this as decreasing egocentricity. The young child is unable to see a situation in terms of any perspective but his own. Little Johnny's egocentricity may mean that when someone suffers to his benefit he is quite unable to see or appreciate the other

person's suffering since his point of view is determined by the pleasure resulting from his benefit. Such an example seems plausible in the case of a young child but implausible in the case of an adult until we consider cases of prejudice. A bigot may be so indignant at having a Negro sit beside him on the bus, that any possibility of him understanding the man's humiliation at being thrown off would be negated. Or a situation might shock or appal us to the extent that we are unable to conceive that other people might be delighted. A puritan's horror at certain passages in Lady Chatterly's Lover may, for example, have prevented him from attending to those aspects of the novel which delighted literary critics. It may be the case that we can, in a cool moment, work out the other point of view, but we will be in sufficient difficulty if our own heightened feelings of the moment make it impossible at the time.

The problem is not as simple as that of overcoming the egocentricity which is apparent in the behaviour of the young child who believes that the moon follows him when he walks at night, for our prejudices and concerns are embedded in beliefs and value systems which develop as we grow older, and of which we may be unaware. They are not merely matters of race and creed and colour but work across ages, between sexes, life-styles, aesthetic views, political beliefs, modes of dress and manners. "Prejudice" is a pejorative word because it is concerned with an irrational element in thought and action. But we expect even a rational man to have certain firm convictions - and these may on occasion intervene when it is necessary to consider another person's "point of view". To be horrified at the actions and the feelings of the Nazi or the Afrikaner may

be to be hindered in working out how such people appraise their world. To be moral the rational man may need such feelings, but he must also know when and how to keep them in check.

But to reconstruct the appraisal of another is to do more than come to believe that there are other ways of viewing the facts, for we may overcome our egocentricity but be quite wrong about what the other point of view actually is. Imagining what another person's point of view is like is a task which can be performed with varying degrees of success. It is very similar to the Piagetian kind of problem where subjects may have to indicate what it would be like to be viewing a model house with a tree beside it, which, viewed from the other side of the table, would be seen with the tree in the reverse position, the chimney displaced and the walls at different angles. Subjects must accomplish some mental construction to complete this task. But our tasks are more complicated than this since the differences with which we must contend are not merely spatial. We can readily suppose that the Piagetian set of logical operations available to the formal operational child will probably be required for these more sophisticated problems. Certainly, reversibility is needed, as can be seen in the case where we attempt to work back from a person's occurrent emotion to reconstruct the particulars of his appraisal. Some of the particulars we hypothesize at certain points may not measure up adequately against the extent of his occurrent emotion and we may be required to undo what we have done or return to an earlier point and explore it more fully. But, of course, the whole business of seeing something from another person's point of view is predicated on our ability to shuffle back and forth

between another way of looking at things and our own.

It is not possible here to give an account of the logical priorities in the acquisition of the particular procedures required for the performance of these tasks, although clearly such investigations are of considerable educational importance. What will be attended to more closely, however, is the form of the construction.

II The Structure of Appraisals

Beliefs and values cohere into systems. It is this which enables us to make reasonable guesses about some features of other people's appraisals when facts are in short supply. There is nothing comparable to this coherence where sensations are concerned. With sensations we are limited to the available evidence and cannot "work out" what the facts might be in quite the same way. But a knowledge of many sets of beliefs and values enables us to make reasonable conjectures about how a person will appraise a given situation once we know enough about them to have identified a few relevant beliefs.

Very crude decisions about the beliefs and values people hold are made when we assign stereotypes to them. A stereotype of the Maori picks out certain sets of beliefs, habits and interests. Like a caricature, it highlights certain features which form a coherent pattern. These features which are picked out as characterising the Maori provide a very limited set of generalisations, each of which may be inadequate in particular cases since the instances upon which it is based may not be very representative. When we say that a person has a stereotype of representatives of a particular group we usually mean

that he has a picture of them which does not do them justice. Thus a stereotype of Maoris may be of beer-drinking, generous, happy-go-lucky, semi-literate producers of large families who care little for the future or the finer things of life. Since such a view might lead us to decide that we will not let our houses to such people or that they may be a bad employment risk, and since such a view would be pernicious if false, our claim that such a view is a stereotype is an expression of moral disapproval. Nevertheless the germ of an interpretive mechanism resides in such stereotypes for they point us toward aspects of situations which will be of concern to those people correctly picked out. We know that the Maori will be disinterested in the politician's plans for the future, care little for education, but be upset if his local pub runs dry.

While the employment of stereotypes should be viewed with caution since through picking out some few features they provide an oversimplified framework for interpreting the complex behaviour of individuals, in addition to being built on weak foundations, this is not to argue that stereotypes should be eliminated from the interpretive repertoire of the rational man. For clearly when we approach complete strangers we must view them under some aspect if our actions toward them are to be considered ones, and a stereotype is perhaps all we can employ until we have acquired some body of facts about them which make a more complex framework possible. Thus we may assign stereotypes on the basis of the colour of skin or language, manner of dress, carriage in social interaction, or vocation, age or sex. To be rational in the use of such generalisations about people, however, does require that their flimsiness be recognised, and

hence that they should not be employed in a rigid fashion or depended upon as more than a means of structuring the initial situation when facts are in short supply. Stereotypes are, of course, closely intermeshed with prejudices, and must be the subject of continual rational scrutiny.

Stereotypes enable us to pick out certain sets of values and beliefs from amongst those which have been accumulated in a particular interpretive scheme. They also help us pick out particular sets of behavioural events from those which have become tagged to a particular emotion, since stereotypes often involve beliefs about conventional ways of expressing various feelings. We all know about the stiff upper lip of the Englishman, the demonstrativeness of the French, the inscrutability of the Oriental, the melodrama of the socialite and the impassiveness of the chess player. And of course some stereotypes suggest characteristic emotional dispositions - the passionate Latin, the dour Scot, the frustrated spinster, the temperamental artist.

As more facts about an individual come in, a number of stereotypes may seem appropriate and may serve to qualify features of each other so that a more complex picture of the other person's structure of beliefs and values becomes possible. When we are introduced to a young man at a party and are informed that he is a school teacher we are immediately able to draw together an interlocking set of beliefs which may be pertinent to our dealings with him - namely those beliefs concerning the beliefs and values of school teachers. But it is not as yet much of a guide since it will either be very general and hence the immediate guidance it can give will be

limited, or if our view of what teachers believe and value is a very detailed and particular view, we are liable, on any one occasion, to be quite wrong.

We may further identify our teacher as a young socialist, however - and believe that he will see education as a means of achieving social justice and equality. We might expect that his values would clash with those who wish to give state aid to private schools or who are indifferent to inadequacies in the education of the disadvantaged. But the stereotypes will also give some structure to our understanding of the ways in which he will view matters other than those concerning education. The "teacher" stereotype will be qualified by the "socialist" one and vice versa. Again, if we perceive him as a rugby enthusiast we will have some idea of some of the things which give him delight, and we would expect an issue over all-white rugby tours from South Africa to expose the relationship between his social values and those concerned with sport, for if his enthusiasm for rugby is very great we could expect a dissonance to arise between these sets of values. And of course any of these particular stereotypes may be further qualified as we see him to be a socialist of the Marxist stamp, or as holding a position slightly to the left of an English Liberal.

As stereotypes become progressively qualified it is apparent that the concept of a stereotype ceases to bite upon the "aspect" under which we view the other person (except in so far as each new distinction we make falls under a stereotype until the force of the other qualifying factors is realised). Rather, we begin to elaborate a set of rules governing the way this person sees the world which is, as a coherent pattern,

unique. Such thorough knowledge of another person, acquired over some time, is knowledge of a complex scheme of rules and causes. Our understanding of this person's behaviour will still be dependent on certain distinctions we make, but these will not arise from expectancies based on poor empirical generalisations about people of certain types.

"Stereotypes" should be distinguished from "role" here. A woman may, for example, be a housewife, a mother and a nurse. Each of these roles is logically distinct. One can be a nurse without ever being a mother, and vice versa. But the rules governing the concepts are so general as to permit a wide range of ways of legitimately performing each role. Two women can be performing the mother role while acting in accord with quite different sets of beliefs. Our knowledge of the one we know intimately will include an understanding of the way in which she views motherhood - of the structure of the beliefs which determine this view, of her habits and inclinations. With a woman we know less well (but know her to be a mother) we must fit her "mother role" behaviour to a stereotype which tells us "how mothers usually behave", "what mothers usually believe", until we are able to identify the specific rules she follows. Often, of course, we do not know people intimately in every sphere. We may be able to predict exactly how a workmate will appraise a situation connected with a business crisis for we may know all of his relevant dispositions, yet our ability to work out how he might appraise matters on the golf course may be severely limited to the point of a quite narrow stereotype (particularly if we know little about golf).

One way of seeing how stereotypes work is to look into a

situation where groups of people clash and outrage each other by their actions. Our stereotypes help us to pick out characteristic sets of beliefs which enable us to see how members of the two groups differ in their appraisal of what is going on. One thing which becomes clear is that certain events may call out certain beliefs which link up into significant combinations in the appraisal merely because the events occur together in the situation. No doubt these beliefs are related together in the individual's belief and value systems, but the juxtaposition of the events highlights relationships which on other occasions may not be very prominent. Belief set A may be intimately bound up with belief set B on this occasion. At another time the combination may be A and C with no element from B making a contribution.

Recent developments arising from an annual event in Christchurch may serve to illustrate this. On ANZAC Day the veterans march to pay their respects to the war dead. On a number of occasions these ceremonies have led to the expression of strong feelings as young people have attempted to lay wreaths bearing placards protesting the death of civilians in Viet Nam. Veterans have cordoned off the Cenotaph, there have been scuffles in the Square and the issues have been extensively debated in the daily press. It is clear that many veterans have become outraged and angry, but what is it that they see when a youth attempts to make such a gesture? Individuals may see the situation in any number of ways, and to know how they feel would require considerable evidence concerning individual behaviour. Some of them may, for example, scuffle and protest in order to "liven up" their day. But there are certain common

elements in the statements of many of the people sufficient for us to make reasonable guesses about sets of beliefs which may be "characteristic".

Firstly, and appropriately enough, the veterans may feel that the protest is an affront to their memory of the dead, that the feelings of those who mourn should be respected, and that the whole concept of protest is out of place here. The question of the rights of the veterans in this matter may be in some doubt since the ceremony is an explicitly public matter on public ground. This issue has some bearing on the rationality of their emotion, but nevertheless some minimal case for the veterans' view can be granted since most of us wish to respect the feelings of those who mourn.

But the occasion is not merely one of remembering the deaths of those with whom danger was shared. It is in a very particular context. The military and the ex-military are remembering the dead of a particular war which they believed (or at least a very large number of them now believe) that they fought to protect a way of life which was not only vital to them but to all mankind. This occasion then, is not only one of valuing the dead but of valuing and publicly acknowledging the value of a particular enterprise. A protest may be inappropriate in this context also - may be seen as being insufficiently respectful of the enterprise itself. In terms of both of these sets of beliefs any protest, including protests for more social security benefits for war widows, may evoke a negative response from war veterans. But still the cordons and the fights point to something stronger.

The veterans may see the protest as being in support of

the communists, and the communists as being the contemporary equivalent to the fascist they fought. To see the kind of parallel which the veterans might see, one must note such aspects of the two systems as the lack of free speech, the activities of the secret police and the general lack of liberty - factors which are supposedly antithetical to the way of life for which the veterans fought. The force of "anti-communism" as the aspect of appraisal becomes more convincing when it is remembered that historically the fear of communism and the cold war followed closely upon the heels of the fear of Nazis and the horror of the Second World War. In this light, to protest against the Viet Nam war is not only to show a lack of respect by protesting, but to directly assault the beliefs of the veterans. It is to betray the way of life that the contemporaries of the veterans fought and died for. It may be empirically false that the communists are a threat, that "the way of life" actually exists or even existed, or that the men really fought to defend it at the time. Yet whatever the truth about such beliefs, it would not be difficult to show how men might become firmly committed to them.

Finally, the protestors are young. There are many ways in which this could be seen to have an effect (using a psychoanalytic scheme like H.J. Pearson's we may see a conflict of generations here in Freudian terms).[18] But there are some features of a way of seeing youth which directly link up with this situation. The veterans and their comrades fought to preserve a way of life for future generations. Here are young

[18] Pearson, H.J., Adolescence and the Conflict of Generations, Norton and Co., N.Y., 1958.

people, not only showing a lack of interest in the struggles of that particular war, but apparently rejecting the way of life itself. They are perhaps members of that large group of young people who believe that the liberty and justice in the way of life for which the veterans fought was not as real as the veterans had been inclined to believe; that the way of life which the young had inherited from the previous generation was rotten and corrupt - that its particular vices were not perhaps very much worse than the vices peculiar to communist systems; and that in the light of this there could be no justification for bombing and displacing civilians in Viet Nam. In addition, the young may be seen as having "had it easy" - as having grown up in an affluent age and as having rejected things associated with that affluence without appreciating how difficult it was to achieve the good things which they take for granted. The veterans' generation had to struggle.

These three areas of belief may link up. The rejection of the bombing and the displacing of civilians may (if communists and Nazis are seen in a similar light by the veterans) be seen as an attack on the actions performed on civilians by allied armies in the Second World War. This would be seen as an attack, not only on the value of the objectives of that enterprise but on the means employed to attain the objectives as well. Similarly, even the view that the protest fails to respect the feelings of those who wish to remember their comrades may link up with the attack on the way of life of the veterans - the young no longer respect even these old values (or so it would seem).

Thus whole patterns of beliefs can join to form a coherent

appraisal. Some of these beliefs are perhaps widely and readily understood (such as the wish that the feelings of the veterans be respected where their dead comrades are concerned). Others might not be so intelligible unless the conditions under which they were acquired are more clearly elaborated. It might be difficult for one born in the fifties, for example, to see why someone might fear communism to the extent that the fear would become such a major element in the calculus of the appraisal. To see what is involved here one may need to gain some idea of what it would be like to have lived through the cold war. The terror of communism manifested itself in a United Nations force in Korea, in McCarthyism in the United States, in a nuclear arms race, a missile race and a Bay of Pigs invasion. Hungary and Tibet were invaded and the world seemed to be under a continual war threat. The fear of communism which was common among so many of their parents may not be present in younger people who grew up in the years when confrontation was being displaced by increasing liaison between East and West. Young people who wish to understand how their elders appraise this situation need not only to take account of things of this kind, but may also need an interpretive scheme to help them understand both sides of the "conflict of generations". Pearson's psychoanalytic account (which has already been referred to) would suggest that amnesia in respect of adolescence and a confrontation between a fading and a flowering sexuality might provide a set of conditions which would modify the appraisal of the middle-aged.

A case of the sort which has been developed above would need to be further refined before we could use it to understand

the appraisal of any particular person, for one or a number of these sets may be absent where an individual is concerned, and the height of his passion may be determined by the importance to him of various of the values or combinations of values. At the beginning of this section it was suggested that stereotypes provide only a crude means of making decisions about the kinds of beliefs and values an individual might hold. We need to be aware of the complexities of this matter of beliefs and values where individuals are concerned: of the effects on appraisals of differences too subtle for stereotypes to contend with.

III Beliefs and Values

Jim may believe that he has certain interpersonal rights (defined by sex) with respect to his wife. He may believe that her current behaviour is intended to capture another man's interest in order that she be seen by him as a sex object. And he may believe that the man is behaving in a way which indicates that such an interest has been captured. If he further believes that these actions performed by his wife and the other man infringe against his rights, and if his belief about rights is at all strongly held he must (logically) be jealous and behaviour predicated on such a set of beliefs would be so termed. A whole set of beliefs is involved here and it is only when they all come together that such an emotion can occur. Thus Jim must believe

1. That he has certain interpersonal rights defined by sex concerning his wife.
2. That certain pieces of behaviour on the part of his

wife toward other men, or of other men towards his wife may threaten these rights.

3. That when this behaviour of his wife towards another man is responded to by a man in such a way as to be a threat to these rights, the two pieces of behaviour, taken together, constitute a violation of these rights.

4. That he has perceived an actual instance of 3.

3 and 4 are crucial. If his wife acts in this particular way, perhaps by attempting to flirt at a party, and no other man responds to her attempts, Jim may be humiliated but he cannot be jealous. Again, if all of the conditions 1 to 3 are met but he fails to believe that he has been confronted with an instance of 3 (he is preoccupied by a crisis at work or the other man is his best friend) then he clearly cannot be jealous.

At first sight it might seem that beliefs 2 to 4 are entailed in 1, since to have certain rights necessitates that certain actions constitute an infringement of them. Nevertheless, the mere belief that he has such rights does not in itself pick out any particular actions taken with certain intentions as being infringements of the rights. Thus belief 4 requires certain beliefs about what the people are actually doing, which involves beliefs about what they are intending. He may quite reasonably believe that when a man performs action A he intends X, whereas when another man performs action A he intends Y (or that a man may perform A on two occasions, intending X on one and Y on another). Thus his interpretation of the situation need not be entirely dependent on his belief about his rights, but may in part be determined by quite independent beliefs

concerning the relationship between other people's beliefs and their actions. Thus to know how Jim feels when he is jealous as a consequence of his wife's flirtation at a party we must know what he believes his rights to be, and how he interprets her actions and the behaviour of those around her. And since, in a particular situation, this may involve more than a knowledge of a string of beliefs held by Jim we must be able to see how beliefs which do not have a logically necessary relationship do in fact structure an appraisal of a coherent kind when events permit them to be linked up.

It might be argued that the analysis does not capture "jealousy" since two people might perceive the same situation with respect to their wives, and whereas one is swept with jealousy the other is disturbed, but not nearly so profoundly moved. Certainly there is some sort of gap between this cognitive analysis of the emotion and its physiological manifestations. Yet the example itself does not support the argument to the extent that is superficially apparent. For when we spell out what would be required of two such men were they to perceive the situation in the same way, it is plain that the case begins to sound rather strange. Firstly, we must assume that they believe the same things with respect to 1 to 3. Second, we may need to assume that they believe the same things regarding the intentions underlying the actions of other people. And finally, we must assume that the beliefs are held in the same way by the two men, and associated with the same values. Certain of our beliefs are held passionately - to abandon them would be to upset the fabric of our world (conservation of quantity, and causality, for example). Other beliefs are

relatively tentative and would be readily abandoned in the face of contrary evidence or argument. Thus a man may hold belief 1 timidly and his appraisal of the party situation may be anxious, but not passionate.

But even if he holds the belief firmly, as a universal rule, he may not much care to exercise his right. His wife may have become abhorrent to him, and although he finds the whole business distasteful, the violation of his rights has less emotional force, being checked by other values and beliefs. Thus it would seem more plausible to argue that our two jealous men were not in fact appraising matters in the same way and that their similarities were more apparent than real. It is subtle differences of the sorts which have been outlined above which are not taken into account by the relatively crude distinctions which stereotypes permit.

This chapter has been concerned with the construction of appraisals. We must now look more closely at the evidence we may utilize.

CHAPTER IV : THE "FACTS" AND THEIR SOURCES

It has been argued that the identification of an emotion experienced by another person depends upon our assessment of bits of his behaviour in the light of an interpretive scheme. This may consist, firstly, in a rule or set of rules which divide one emotion from another in a conceptual scheme, and secondly, in a set of behaviours and actions which may (but need not) be logically related to the rule or set of rules. Thus if John says that his brother has transgressed against his rights and that, because of this he would like to kick him in the shins, his statement conforms to the rules of the concept of "anger". The manner in which he thumps the table may also be related to the concept of "anger", but contingently so, for this action does not meet all of the logical requirements of the concept: it is possible to perform this act without being angry.. Yet "thumping the table" is included as a part of the framework for inferring anger since it has been seen to be a sufficiently characteristic action where anger occurs. Similarly, certain kinds of behaviour are logically incompatible with holding certain beliefs or values (burning the old masters you value very much when no other beliefs or values intrude to override those values). Certain other pieces of behaviour are psychologically related to particular beliefs (blushing when you believe you have been caught out). Thus there are "facts" which fall under interpretive schemes and for which we can look, and which we can work together as a basis for constructing someone's appraisal. Also, rather importantly, the accumulation of these facts can, when related to each other and to our own experience, permit us

to build new interpretive schemes or add to the ones we have, and to refine our stereotypes. This chapter will be concerned with these "facts", the kinds of events one might attend to in the search for such facts, and the manner, specifically, in which the study of works of literature may enable us to acquire facts and improve our facility in working with them appropriately.

We build interpretive schemes, unravel belief and value systems and flesh out stereotypes through attending to the manner in which we and others respond to the world we experience. The elements of such experience which we employ in practice may in the end be quite inappropriate, or our interpretations false, but there is no reason in principle why this should be so. In so far as we do have knowledge concerning other people's feelings in particular situations it must be built up from facts about our own feelings in the past, or facts deduced or inferred from the behaviour of others. These last facts may have been gathered from a wide variety of sources - not only from our confrontations with various people in the past or at second-hand, either through anecdotes, drama or literature (including biography and autobiography) but also through forms of investigation which are employed in a systematic fashion to consider human behaviour or factors influencing human behaviour (such as history, psychology, sociology, anthropology or the medical sciences). Findings from such areas may be relevant in different ways, depending on the context and the type of feeling involved.

There are many important distinctions which might be made between the sources of data which we may use to establish the

facts of the matter. There are differences, for example, between the evidence of our eyes and ears when we are confronted with someone in the grip of some feeling, and the evidence which is built up from the observations made by other people. Here we have not only the difficulty of the reliability of someone else's hearing and seeing, but also their ability to communicate to us whatever it is that they see and hear, and however they interpret it.

I Sources of Facts

Alasdair MacIntyre distinguishes utterances, which express emotions, from sentences and statements which report them.

> When I tell you what I feel I do not express the emotion, I report it. Or rather I may or may not be expressing the emotion in the act of reporting it, but I am certainly reporting it. This is partly a matter of to whom I am speaking. If I am angry with you and I say "I am angry with you", I am doubtless expressing my anger in the act of reporting it. But if I am angry with you and say to someone else "I am angry with Smith" then it would be odd to say that I was expressing my anger. It is, in any case, utterances and neither sentences nor statements that are expressive of emotion, and utterances may certainly stand to an emotion just as other behaviour stands to it. But what I say when I so utter does not stand in the same relationship to the emotion. - - - Certainly I may so utter the sentence "I am angry" with clenched lips, gnashing teeth and all the conventional accompaniments of anger, whatever they are, in such a way that my utterance is an expression of my anger. But my utterance of "$E=mc^2$" can be an expression of my anger in just the same way as my utterance of "I am angry".[19]

Thus, "yes", "no" or "so" can be intoned in a variety of different ways to express different kinds of feeling. Far more subtle forms of expression occur in the choice of the words themselves - from the manner and style of speech. We frequently find examples of this in the "tone" of letters, where the

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[19] MacIntyre, A.C., "Behaviour, Belief and Emotion", Interpretations of Life and Mind, (ed.) Grene, M. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971. Page 92.

intonation is lacking. Evidence of feeling can even be gained sometimes from certain features of the content of statements even when they do not report a feeling. Disparagement is often used to infer envy. Repeated expressions of hope that misfortune may befall someone may indicate hate. Recurrent defence of another person's actions, and praise of their virtues may be seen to reflect admiration, love, worship or devotion. And, of course, what is not said may, in some contexts, contribute to the evidence we call upon to support a claim to know how another person feels. Clearly such facts are frequently very ambiguous when the matter of correct interpretation arises, but this is a problem independent of the kinds of facts themselves.

Other relevant kinds of observable behaviours range from physiological changes such as blushing, to actions performed or omitted. "Physiological changes" is a rather inadequate category, since even a smile involves some physiological change. What is meant is rather that some elements of behaviour indicate particular feelings without being expressions of them. A smile is usually seen as a form of expression - an "expression" being something which could have been otherwise, or could have been subjected to voluntary control. There are, however, some physiological changes which mark out feelings rather than express them. We can do little directly to control our heartbeat, our perspiration, or the colour in our faces. Such physiological changes often seem to indicate certain kinds of sensations, and since sensations often accompany occurrent emotion (blushing and embarrassment) such indications may be relevant facts. Matters of movement and posture such as the dispirited slouch or the proud stance may also be important.

We may move with confidence, or fearfully. We may make gestures of indifference.

Contextual information is often vital. The absence of certain pieces of behaviour may be significant in the light of the circumstances. Since he is supposed to be in love with the girl, the fact that he is seeing very little of her now may suggest that his feelings have changed (or have her's changed?). If Mrs Jones really doesn't believe that anything has happened to her son, why doesn't she go out tonight as she had planned? In addition, the contextual facts mark out the other side of the appraisal coin, permitting us to see what the appraisal picks out. The construction of the appraisal is often a matter of an interaction between the behavioural and contextual facts. Once the foundations have been laid, the facts on one side permit more facts on the other to be picked out.

> Jim seems terrified. How do we know? We attend to him and see that our belief arises from the way he is staring. What is he terrified of? We look at the situation to see what he is staring at. What does he see to be scared of in that? We return to consider things we know about him from the past - what he has told us that he believes about things like that, or what he has shown us through his previous behaviour.

- - - we waver back and forth between qualities of the object and what we know about Jim.

II "Primary" and "Secondary" Facts

The primary/secondary distinction has been made to facilitate a discussion of the differences between first- and

second-hand experience. The "primary" facts of John's feelings are obtained when we are confronted with John experiencing a feeling. We see his facial configuration, his posture, his movement; and we hear his statements and other utterances. The extent to which we are able to locate the facts when our own observations are at stake is largely dependent upon the appropriateness of the stereotypes and interpretive schemes we have developed, and on our ability to unravel the bases of our own appraisals. These features and memory are crucial in the task of distinguishing fact from falsehood and appropriate fact from inappropriate. Nevertheless, while we can more readily investigate the validity of our own observation, the contributions of such observations to the kinds of knowledge we need if we are to know how another person feels is strictly limited by the lack of opportunity to observe in suitable ways a sufficiently wide range of people in emotional situations.

"Secondary" facts are mediated by other people before they are available to our perception. Thus, when we are told by Jim how John reacted to the news, the knowledge of the facts about Jim will depend on the validity of Jim's interpretation of John's behaviour and Jim's ability to communicate his interpretation to us as well as on the "primary" part - the validity of our interpretation of what Jim said. The vast bulk of our knowledge of the factors which influence the feelings of others is gained from what other people tell us. Much of it comes in the form of simplified rules and generalisations which can be fitted into our existing schemes, obviating the task of sifting the raw data of experience and linking it up to form the generalisations for ourselves. But much of this secondary

information is false. Can we recover the raw data through these secondary sources (even in principle)? And if not, upon what grounds may we validate this information?

Jim may wish to impart certain information to us concerning John's feelings. If this information arrives in the form "John is angry", we have a secondary fact without any knowledge of the primary facts upon which it is based, and we have no way of checking whether or not Jim's interpretation is appropriate in terms of what there was to be seen or heard. Jim may, however, attempt to show us what the primary facts were. He may say that John frowned, clenched his teeth, thumped the table, said that such a thing could not be permitted. This still might not do, for in terms of the interpretive schemes we employ, the description may be as appropriate for "determination" as it is for "anger". But given that Jim has presented us with sufficient details of behaviour and context (John was not, for example, acting the fool) for us to agree that these pieces of behaviour, in the light of our interpretive scheme, should be seen as "angry", all that remains for us to consider, is whether the words he has used are correct descriptions. Did John <u>really</u> frown, <u>really</u> thump? There are many disagreements which Jim and I might have over the appropriate description of a primary fact. When does a wince become a flinch? Was it a smile or a leer? A sneer or a wry grin?

Although there are fuzzy areas between such concepts, there is less difficulty in settling such disagreements than is at first apparent. People who sneer and people who grin wryly are expressing different ways of viewing an incident in respect

to themselves. There is a difference of attitude or disposition which could be settled by evidence from other sources (by asking them, for example). The problem of the secondary fact is not that it cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed in principle, but that the additional evidence is rarely available in practice.

Once we are sure of the sincerity of the source of the secondary information its validation depends either on the extent to which the primary data can be made available to us, or on the extent to which we can rely upon the judgements of the secondary source. Such an assessment requires a knowledge of the rationality of the procedures employed by our source - its objectivity and the sophistication of the interpretive frame-works available, and the consistency and appropriateness with which they are employed. Yet even when this information is lacking, we may still decide to believe that our source is reliable, simply because its information has been shown to be correct so very frequently in the past. We know that some people are very good at being able to sort out how people feel.

There are of course some sources of secondary information which are open to public scrutiny, both in terms of the procedures employed and the actual data used. These are the highly developed, rationalised forms of enquiry such as social science, history and medical research. Since these forms of thought are concerned with the abstraction of generalisable findings from particular events it is vital that the manner in which such enquiries are conducted should be a public matter. Such studies are able to make important contributions to the construction and rationalisation of the interpretive scheme and the correction and elaboration of stereotypes, but clearly in

many particular situations we must depend upon the eyes and ears of our friends and acquaintances, who may not be familiar with the relevant fields. The restrictions imposed by the pressures of the occasion may mean that time is not available for the detailed setting out of data and procedure which make the status of the findings in these fields matters of public scrutiny.

It should be plain then, that one of the steps we might take if we were to make a deliberate attempt to develop someone's ability to work out how another person feels would be to initiate him into the form and content of these modes of enquiry. But since the purpose of such studies is to unravel general laws and rules governing human behaviour and since the amount of personal contact with various people in emotional situations is severely limited by the restricted and painstaking manner in which such studies must be pursued, some way must be found of developing the ability to make sense of the kinds of primary information one has available in everyday life. It is usual to suggest the use of fiction in this connection, although as will be shown later, the suggestion brings with it a peculiar set of problems.

The view has an obvious plausibility, for we seem to be able to claim without danger of serious question that many works of fiction represent emotional states and their contexts with considerable accuracy. To further demonstrate the value of this claim it is necessary to admit and leave to one side at this point the obvious fact that the emotional states and circumstances of characters in fiction are often distorted in the interests of art, morality or polemics away from what would

be probable in the real world. Nevertheless, actors in the drama attempt to express the feelings of their characters in a psychologically plausible manner, and playwrights and producers give context to the expression which can make some sense of it. If the links between behaviour, belief and context are based on a sufficiently sophisticated understanding, then to the extent that the behaviour is accurately reproduced in the play there will be a set of primary facts which can serve to inform those with interpretive schemes which are relatively naive, through showing how the physical activity of a person may give expression to his beliefs and values.

III The Use of Fiction

There are many problems, practical and theoretical, which would need to be resolved before we can launch into schools and use literature in an attempt to develop in our pupils the ability to work out the feelings of others. But before there is any point in trying to solve these problems it must be more clearly demonstrated that important features of the discussion in the last two chapters can be illustrated from works of literature. Dickens' Great Expectations will be used for this purpose. His narrator, Pip, passes through an emotional crisis when he begins a new life.

> So subdued I was by those tears, and by their breaking out again in the course of the quiet walk, that when I was on the coach, and it was clear of the town, I deliberated with an aching heart whether I would not get down when we changed horses and walk back, and have another evening at home, and a better parting. We changed, and I had not made up my mind, and still reflected for my comfort that it would be quite practicable to get down and walk back, when we changed again. And while I was occupied with these deliberations, I would fancy an exact resemblance to Joe in some man coming along the road towards us, and my heart

> would beat high. - As if he could possibly be there!
>
> We changed again, and yet again, and now it was too late and too far to go back, and I went on. And the mists had all solemnly risen now, and the world lay spread before me.[20]

Pip is reporting on his own high emotional state in this passage. The things that we can actually learn here about his state are, however, rather limited. Another passenger on the coach would probably be able to see that he was agitated and upset. He might guess at one cause - Pip's leaving home. He might guess at the general focus of his concern - home and parents. We can learn a little more from the passage than could the other passenger, of course, for we have Pip's own report on his feelings. We know that one of his preoccupations was with Joe, and we know that Pip was not happy about the way he left home - that he was perhaps a little ashamed. There is not much detail among the primary facts he reports, as there rarely is in novels (much detail of this sort impedes the action). He is "subdued"; he "deliberates with an aching heart"; he fancies "an exact resemblance of Joe". These all involve or hint at appraisals, of things he thinks about and remembers. All of these involve a net of beliefs and values which are not made clear here. Beyond knowing that he is a boy upset by leaving home we know very little about Pip and the particular way in which he views this departure.

Although there are few primary facts in this passage to enable us to understand this agitation which is distinctively Pip's, a reader of the whole novel will see far more here: will in fact see his appraisal rather clearly, for the agitation

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[20] Dickens, C., Great Expectations, Penguin, 1965. Page 187.

arises from a tension between the things he values in the world he is leaving and the things he values in the world to which he travels. And these can be spelled out. Thus it would be possible to use such a novel as a means of investigating the relationship between a set of beliefs and values and the appraisals which might occur in a particular context.

Pip had a very strong attachment to his brother-in-law Joe. He grew up in Joe's house and under his protection. But Joe was his companion and close friend - he did not take the role of a father, but was an equal. He protected Pip from his tyrannical sister and played games with him. They spent much time in each other's company. Pip loved Joe and treasured his good opinion.

> It was much upon my mind (particularly when I first saw him looking for his file) that I ought to tell Joe the whole truth. Yet I did not, and for the reason that I mistrusted that if I did, he would think me worse than I was. The fear of losing Joe's confidence, and of thenceforth sitting in the chimney-corner at night staring drearily at my for ever lost companion and friend, tied up my tongue. I morbidly represented to myself that if Joe knew it, I never afterwards could see him at the fireside feeling his fair whisker, without thinking that he was meditating on it.[21]

Joe was "a mild, good-natured, sweet-tempered, easy-going, foolish, dear fellow".[22]

> Young as I was, I believe that I dated a new admiration of Joe from that night. We were equals afterwards, as we had been before; but, afterwards at quiet times when I sat looking at Joe and thinking about him, I had a new sensation of feeling conscious that I was looking up to Joe in my heart.[23]

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[21] Ibid. Page 72.
[22] Ibid. Page 40.
[23] Ibid. Page 80.

Feeling as he did about Joe, it can readily be appreciated that he would feel very upset when the time came to leave home (for whatever reason). However, other aspects of his view of the world at that time enter to make his appraisal of his departure far more potent emotionally. For a long time there had been nothing which would have given him more pleasure than the prospect of being apprenticed to Joe and working in the forge. But he had become involved in the lives of a middle-class family and was infatuated with Estella, the ward of the ageing Miss Havisham. His humble background and his coarseness bowed him down. The life that he aspired to conflicted with the life that he lived. Biddy, the simple good-natured girl who joined the household and had been his first teacher, became his confidant. Joe and Biddy were the people he loved, but their life was too coarse and common. He dreamt of being a gentleman and a match for Estella and was embarrassed by their simplicity.

> "Biddy," said I, after binding her to secrecy, "I want to be a gentleman."
> "Oh, I wouldn't, if I was you!" she returned. "I don't think it would answer."
> "Biddy," said I with some severity, "I have particular reasons for wanting to be a gentleman."
> "You know best, Pip; but don't you think you are happiest as you are?"
> "Biddy," I exclaimed, impatiently, "I am not happy as I am. I am disgusted with my calling and with my life. I have never taken to either, since I was bound. Don't be absurd."
> "Was I absurd?" said Biddy, quietly raising her eyebrows; "I am sorry for that; I didn't mean to be. I only want you to do well, and to be comfortable."
> "Well then, understand once for all that I never shall or can be comfortable - or anything but miserable - there, Biddy! - unless I can lead a very different sort of life from the life I lead now."
> "That's a pity!" said Biddy, shaking her head with a sorrowful air. - - -
>
> "If I could have settled down," I said to Biddy, plucking up the short grass within reach, - - "if I could

> have settled down and been half as fond of the forge as I was when I was little, I know it would have been much better for me. You and I and Joe would have wanted nothing then, and Joe and I would perhaps have gone partners when I was out of my time, and I might have grown up to keep company with you, and we might have sat on this very bank on a fine Sunday, quite different people. I should have been good enough for you; shouldn't I, Biddy?"
>
> Biddy sighed as she looked at the ships sailing on, and returned for answer, "Yes; I am not over-particular." It scarcely sounded flattering, but I knew she meant well.
>
> "Instead of that," said I, plucking up more grass and chewing a blade or two, "see how I am going on. Dissatisfied, and uncomfortable, and - what would it signify to me, being coarse and common, if nobody had told me so!"[24]

Then, miraculously and mysteriously he was endowed with the means of becoming a gentleman. It seemed to him that Miss Havisham was the source of his expectations, and that she meant him to have Estella. He loved Joe. But Joe would not do as he was. Pip was to be a man of position, and he had a particular view of what such a man should be like, how he should carry himself, and who he should know (a set of beliefs of a very "snobbish" variety).

> "And it is, Biddy," said I, "that you will not omit any opportunity of helping Joe on, a little."
>
> "How helping him on?" asked Biddy, with a steady sort of glance.
>
> "Well! Joe is a dear good fellow - in fact, I think he is the dearest fellow that ever lived - but he is rather backward in some things. For instance, Biddy, in his learning and his manners."
>
> Although I was looking at Biddy as I spoke, and although she opened her eyes very wide when I had spoken, she did not look at me.
>
> "Oh, his manners! won't his manners do, then?" asked Biddy, plucking a black-currant leaf.
>
> "My dear Biddy, they do very well here -"
>
> "Oh! they do very well here?" interrupted Biddy, looking closely at the leaf in her hand.
>
> "Hear me out - But if I were to remove Joe into a higher sphere, as I shall hope to remove him when I fully come into my property, they would hardly do him justice."[25]

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[24] Ibid. Page 154.

[25] Ibid. Page 175.

Pip had new clothes made and prepared to leave for London. He did not wish to be seen dressed in his new finery, but accompanied by his friends.

> I was leaving the village at five in the morning, carrying my little hand-portmanteau, and I had told Joe that I wished to walk away all alone. I am afraid - sore afraid - that this purpose originated in my sense of the contrast there would be between me and Joe, if we went to the coach together. I had pretended with myself that there was nothing of this taint in the arrangement; but when I went up to my little room on this last night, I felt compelled to admit that it might be so, and had an impulse upon me to go down again and entreat Joe to walk with me in the morning. I did not.[26]

He burst into tears on his walk into town (the tears referred to in the initial extract), and afterwards was "more sorry, more aware of (his) own ingratitude, more gentle".

And so it is apparent that Pip was not upset merely as a boy might have been on leaving the places where he grew up. He was caught in a conflict between the two sets of values which had come to lie at the very centre of his life. It is also clear that the occasion of this burst of emotion was the occasion of a new self-appraisal; an awareness of the manner in which his thoughts had betrayed the love of his friend. It was perhaps a minimal self-awareness, for Pip was inclined to avoid the implications of many of his actions and to explain away his less laudable motives. But here for a moment he could see, at least partially, what he had done. He would have liked to have had another evening at home "and a better parting".

This discussion of the incident in Great Expectations when Pip leaves home should serve to illustrate the manner in which literature might be used in education when attempts are made to

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[26] Ibid. Page 185.

improve students' facility in knowing how other people feel. A more precise knowledge than is possible when the emotional content of a situation in a novel is viewed in isolation can be gained by searching back for evidence of beliefs and values giving a more particular structure to the appraisals involved. This is essentially the same procedure we must employ when we attempt to make sense of someone else's feelings in everyday life. Sometimes it is necessary to draw isolated facts together into explanations. Occasionally we are presented with ready-made explanations which have been put together by other people, although sometimes these have been assembled for occasions which only resemble that with which we are immediately concerned and hence the fit may be incomplete. An illustration of these points can be found again in Great Expectations, when Miss Havisham suggests to Pip that he love Estella.

> Then, Estella being gone and we two left alone, she turned to me, and said in a whisper:
> "Is she beautiful, graceful, well-grown? Do you admire her?"
> "Everybody must who sees her, Miss Havisham."
> She drew an arm round my neck, and drew my head close down to hers as she sat in the chair. "Love her, love her, love her! How does she use you?"
> Before I could answer (if I could have answered so difficult a question at all), she repeated, "Love her, love her, love her! If she favours you, love her. If she wounds you, love her! If she tears your heart to pieces - and as it gets older and stronger, it will tear deeper - love her, love her, love her!"
> Never had I seen such passionate eagerness as was joined to her utterance of these words. I could feel the muscles of the thin arm around my neck, swell with the vehemence that possessed her.
> "Hear me, Pip! I adopted her to be loved. I bred her and educated her, to be loved. I developed her into what she is, that she might be loved. Love her!"
> She said the word often enough, and there could be no doubt that she meant to say it; but if the often repeated word had been hate instead of love - despair - revenge - dire death - it could not have sounded from her lips more like a curse.

> "I'll tell you," said she, in the same hurried passionate whisper, "what real love is. It is blind devotion, unquestioning self-humiliation, utter submission, trust and belief against yourself and against the whole world, giving up your whole heart and soul to the smiter - as I did!"
>
> When she came to that, and to a wild cry that followed that, I caught her round the waist. For she rose up in the chair, in her shroud of a dress, and struck at the air as if she would as soon have struck herself against the wall and fallen dead.[27]

For Miss Havisham, falling in love was a disaster - she gave up her heart and soul to the smiter. To exhort Pip to love Estella was, then, to wish him ill. But why should she wish him to come to harm? We will search in vain in the novel for any reason or cause for this attitude to Pip other than that he is a male who happens to stand in a certain relationship to Estella. Why should we think that Pip's maleness evokes in Miss Havisham a desire to crush him? Herbert explained to Pip why he believed that Miss Havisham wished to "wreak revenge on all the male sex".

> "Miss Havisham, you must know, was a spoilt child. Her mother died when she was a baby, and her father denied her nothing. Her father was a country gentleman down in your part of the world, and was a brewer. - - - Well! Mr Havisham was very rich and very proud. So was his daughter."
>
> "Miss Havisham was an only child?" I hazarded.
>
> "- - - No, she was not an only child; she had a half-brother. Her father privately married again - his cook, I rather think. - - - He married his second wife privately, because he was proud, and in the course of time she died. When she was dead, I apprehend he first told his daughter what he had done, and then the son became part of the family, residing in the house you are acquainted with. As the son grew a young man, he turned out riotous, extravagant, undutiful - altogether bad. At last his father disinherited him; but he softened when he was dying and left him well off, though not nearly so well off as Miss Havisham.
>
> Miss Havisham was now an heiress, and you may suppose was looked after as a great match. Her half-brother had now ample means again, but what with debts and what

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[27] Ibid. Page 261.

> with new madness wasted them most fearfully again. There were stronger differences between him and her, than there had been between him and his father, and it is suspected that he cherished a deep and mortal grudge against her, as having influenced the father's anger. - - -
>
> There appeared on the scene - say at the races, or the public baths, or anywhere else you like - a certain man, who made love to Miss Havisham. I never saw him, for this happened five-and-twenty years ago -, but I have heard my father mention that he was a showy-man, and the kind of man for the purpose. - - - This man pursued Miss Havisham closely, and professed to be devoted to her. I believe she had not shown much susceptibility up to that time; but all the susceptibilities she possessed certainly came out then, and she passionately loved him. There is no doubt that she perfectly idolized him. He practised on her affection in that systematic way, that he got great sums of money from her, and he induced her to buy her brother out of a share in the brewery (which had been weakly left him by his father) at an immense price, on the plea that when he was her husband he must hold and manage it all. Your guardian was not at that time in Miss Havisham's councils, and she was too haughty and too much in love to be advised by any one. Her relations were poor and scheming, with the exception of my father; he was poor enough, but not time-serving or jealous. The only independent one among them, he warned her that she was doing too much for this man, and was placing herself too unreservedly in his power. The marriage day was fixed, the wedding tour was planned out, the wedding guests were invited. The day came, but not the bridegroom. He wrote her a letter - - -"
>
> "Which she received," I struck in, "when she was dressing for her marriage? At twenty minutes to nine?"
>
> "At the hour and the minute," said Herbert, nodding, "at which she afterwards stopped the clocks. - - - When she recovered from a bad illness that she had, she laid the whole place waste as you have seen it, and she has never since looked upon the light of day."[28]

These incidents would serve to give some explanation of Miss Havisham's desire for revenge upon males. But she did not, of course, set out systematically to hurt men. The few who came and went in her life were not treated in a manner remarkably different from the way in which women were treated. Pip appears at times to have been acknowledged with some favour. Why then this outburst; this visiting of revenge upon Pip? The key appears to lie in the relationship between Pip and

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[28] Ibid. Page 203.

Estella. Pip was sent to play at Miss Havisham's house when he was very young. He and Estella grew up together. It seems likely that Miss Havisham relived her tragic romance through the pair, but with this difference, that as time went on she schooled Estella in the art of breaking hearts. She did not attempt to take revenge on every man, but on the man who would court her. She saw herself as Estella to such an extent that she failed to see how Estella was actually developing. She saw Pip sometimes as he was, but at other times (as in the passage) as an object of revenge. At a climactic episode when Estella was explaining that she could never feel love, Miss Havisham saw the extent and the effect of her misperceptions, and she was filled with remorse.

Herbert's explanation is thus inadequate on its own. To make a case along the lines of this argument for the view of Pip which Miss Havisham may have had, it would be necessary to trace in detail the development of the relationship between the three, and to employ an interpretive scheme which would link the tragic occasion in the past with the various identifications - Miss Havisham with Estella, and Pip with the false lover.

This section has served to show that many of the considerations which apply in everyday life in respect of knowing how other people feel also apply if we attempt to work out the feelings of characters in fiction. Clearly such a discussion could be pursued much further. What, for example, of the status of the information available to us in fiction? There are limits to the measures we can take to ensure that we have the facts since we are limited to what can be found in the work itself. Also, there are differences between a first-person

narrative like Great Expectations and a third-person one employing an eye-of-God technique. The validity of the information in the latter case is, by definition, beyond question; but is Pip's account to be trusted? We could pursue this further by seeking out Pip's inconsistencies, by showing where he is less than frank (and why he might be so) and by unravelling his beliefs and prejudices about other people. It is plain, for example, that he misjudges Miss Havisham's intentions, that his snobbishness for some time warps his view of Magwitch, and that his infatuation for Estella prevents him from seeing how she must lead her life.

Still, we do not, in thus working out a fictional character's feelings, completely solve the educational problem of filling the gap between studies useful for developing the more general interpretive schemes or elaborating stereotypes and belief systems, and studies which can help students to come to terms with the grit and grain of behaviour in immediate situations. The kind of fiction which has already been described (the novel) rarely contains primary facts which the reader can assess - direct speech and interior monologue are two of the few exceptions, and in the former case much of the quality (intonation) is lacking. We are confronted with a situation already interpreted either through the eye-of-God; or through the eye of the narrator, and the information very frequently reaches us in a descriptive form far removed from the details of the facial contortion or quality of voice and movement upon which the interpretation is based. There are, however, areas of fiction which can give observers more direct experience of these things.

IV Dramatic Fiction

The particular point of drama rests on those things which can be expressed through human action in addition to the purely verbal. Drama can employ intonation, facial expression and movement. The audience for the most part is confronted with the primary facts of the matter, vastly extending that which is available through dialogue in a novel. To be sure the behaviour which manifests itself on the stage may be grossly distorted for artistic (or dramatic) reasons. Nevertheless, where some sort of social realism is essential to the drama, and where we are required to work out a character's feelings by the way in which he acts, it is essential that the behaviour links up or can be made to link up with existing interpretive schemes. Drama can surely provide considerable educational opportunity to observe the behaviour of different people under different conditions in situations where the behaviour is considered important and distractions can be paired down to a minimum.

The quality of acting is thus a vital consideration. Acting which is shoddy or psychologically implausible will fail to give the appropriate experiences. Educators must necessarily pay close critical attention not only to the psychological appropriateness of expressions of feeling in fiction used for these educational purposes, but also to acting quality. A good case could be made for exposing pupils to films which have been compiled from significant performances by proficient actors. Film, television and intimate drama would perhaps be preferable to the traditional theatre behind a proscenium arch where behavioural exaggeration is required merely to overcome the

problem of distance between actor and audience. Film and television have very great potential, since close-ups can always reduce the problem of distance, and the eye of the camera can force attention to those features which are important in a particular interpretive scheme.

Although it has been demonstrated in this section that literature can illustrate the important features of procedures we might employ when we attempt to know how another person feels, it is not clear that we should use literature for this purpose in educational programmes. It would come as no surprise for us to learn that an enthusiast for the teaching of literature in schools had become somewhat perturbed by the direction this thesis seems to have taken. "Let us take literature", the argument suggests, "and use it to develop certain skills and understandings which will assist the moral education of our pupils". This enthusiast will not unnaturally want to be shown that such a development will in no way hinder a literary education, and that literature teaching does not slowly get pushed out of the literature period as moral education creeps in. He may argue that the purposes of this thesis could be served by using works of little literary merit but which contain useful information about people's feelings.

A consideration of this question will require that we turn our attention to the problems of literary value and the significance for literary experience of the mental states of characters in works of fiction. This will permit an understanding of the purposes of literary criticism and of the constraints which the nature of literature imposes upon the procedures critics employ. Such an understanding will be superficial but sufficient for us

to make some decisions about the incompatibility of these procedures with those outlined in Chapters III and IV, and to assess the merit of our enthusiast's suggestion.

It should be pointed out that, although it may become apparent that literature can make a far greater contribution to moral education than the development of the ability to know how other people feel, no explicit case will be made for a more extensive use in this thesis. The more limited case being argued here merely depends on literature's fundamental concern with human affairs.

CHAPTER V : LITERATURE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER PEOPLE'S FEELINGS

I The Value of Art

We must begin our consideration of literature by making some distinctions with respect to the concepts of "art" and "aesthetic". This is always a worrying task since people seem to so readily disagree over what art is. Critics do not concern themselves with finding philosophically satisfying definitions of "art" or "literature", but "get on with the job" instead. But their "job" does not seem to conform with the usual conceptions of knowledge-seeking activities. It is not philosophical, and it does not seem very similar to the more clearly empirical enquiries. Unlike the "job" of the scientist, it is not the critic's concern to accumulate theoretical knowledge about the world or to refine procedures employed to this end. Notions of "progress" in the two fields are radically different. What counts as good art or appropriate procedure in one age may be abandoned in the next, but then be brought back into prominence on some future occasion in a modified form. This difference from other forms of rational enquiry can, of course, be explained, and it need not mean, as some are inclined to think, that the logical structure of the field and the justification of its procedures must remain elusive to philosophers, and hence suspect.

But theories of art do seem to differ from each other rather radically. One of the reasons for this may centre on the part which feelings are seen to play. Works of art are

sometimes said to express the feelings of their creators. It also seems to be assumed sometimes that we should, through the work of art, experience something like the feelings which have been experienced by the artist and which he has attempted to express. Yet again, sometimes philosophers speak as though the correct response to art is an "aesthetic" one - by which they mean a particular kind of emotion such as a man might feel for a beautiful mountain or a sunset. Works of art, they seem to say, are just man-made versions of things to respond to in this way. Although few now talk of special "aesthetic emotions" the sense of this is still present in much of the language. And finally, theorists speak as though there is something to be gained from art apart from the reproduction of an artist's feelings, or the satisfaction one gains from contemplating something beautiful - that there is some knowledge to be gained, some wisdom about the world.

There is truth in all of these positions, yet many formulations of art theories emphasise one or more at the expense of others and fail to show how they all may contribute. There is a tendency for the feelings of the artist to receive undue emphasis. This tendency may, in part, arise from a misunderstanding of the relationship between the emotions which underly the production of a work of art and the emotional experiences we have when we confront it. It is often assumed that the artist expresses feelings, and that we can participate in his emotional experiences when we come to terms with the work. Now it is true (as has been shown in previous chapters) that we can come to know what a person feels by means of his emotional expression, but as a view of art it becomes absurd if we reduce

art to a sophisticated means of access to the emotions of another man. The germs of art are no doubt to be found in the emotional experiences of artists, and the motivation to produce art may also arise out of particular emotions. Certainly artists sometimes seem to recreate an emotional response they have had by setting out the kinds of conditions from which a comparable appraisal may be reconstructed, and by describing thoughts or sensations. Thus, for example, a love poem can be seen as expressing feelings of love. It is not surprising that in such cases the relationship between the experience of the artist and the response of the viewer should be seen as very direct. We seem to be caught up in the artist's feelings. But in many works the feelings of the men who made them are not so nakedly exposed. Can we reasonably suggest that in Macbeth the feelings of Shakespeare are expressed - can we, that is, pick out particular things he felt? If we agree that a person who views a particular passage correctly must feel despair, do we commit ourselves to saying that Shakespeare expressed despair here - a despair that he felt? Clearly not. Of course, when we say that he expressed despair, we may mean that he expressed thoughts or ideas about despair, but on the one hand this does not seem to capture what people who talk about artistic expression seem to be trying to say, and on the other hand it is very frequently a poor description of what confronts us in the work, since the material to be found in such cases so often seems to have been assembled to arouse some emotion in us, not to describe or explain it. Thus we will be misled if we permit the "art as expression" notion to encourage the view that the correct response to a work of art is to be measured in terms of

certain mental events of the artist.

From the point of view of appreciating works of art (the aspect with which a critic is concerned), it may be more useful to view them as "evoking" emotions rather than as "expressing" them. (We cannot, of course, assume this view so readily where the production of art is concerned.) Feelings are evoked by works of art through a display of elements of situations which commonly lead to certain kinds of appraisals, by calling up traditional associations, or those underlying much of human experience and worked upon by certain colours, rhythms, tones or pitches. The response to a work of art depends upon a host of additional cognitions - matters of memory, comparison and interpretation. Even a brief survey of criticism of important plays or novels will reveal that sensitive appraisals make considerable intellectual demands. One must have sophisticated competencies and much information to see the point. When we say that art is concerned with feelings where science and history are concerned with facts we are pointing out very crudely that the function of art is to produce a response. When we use something as a work of art we use it as something to be moved by in some way. Criticism is concerned with showing the value of objects worthy of consideration as art by showing how they should appropriately be viewed.

We use art, then, to perform some perceptual "work" upon us; to be attended to so that it may move us. And it is important to note that our response is not just "to the work of art" but "to the work of art in the light of our experiences". Even abstract art works this way.

> What is the purpose of these differing shapes? We may say that all of them, each in its own way, attempts to make us experience through forms and colours the behaviour of basic patterns of forces characteristic of what happens inside and outside of us all. - - - Once such patterns of forces have been discovered to be the carriers of expression in traditional art, we realize that they are not dependent upon the representation of objects. The Japanese wave may vanish, but its sweep may remain. To be sure, we give up a powerful means of expression when we abandon the so-called subject matter in painting and sculpture, and there is reason to believe that in the long run we shall not wish to put up with the loss. But there is also a gain in the purity of form and the directness of expression which has often been compared, somewhat loosely, with the pure sounds of music. Be this as it may, abstract art surely resembles all other art in that it, too, makes statements about reality and that in these statements reside its meaning and its justification.[29]

Nevertheless, we do not consider as art everything which is made by men with the intention that it "move" us. There is the question of aesthetic satisfaction. Beardsley argues that

> the goodness in which we take an interest (when our interest is aesthetic) is something that arises out of the ingredients of the poem itself; the ways its verbal parts - its structure and texture - combine and cooperate to make something fresh and novel emerge. The words have to work on us. They work by manipulating our understanding of things not in the parts. Heterogeneous words, improbably yoked, make suddenly a metaphor, and something is meant there that was never meant before. The names and verbs strung together concresce into a story, with dramatic tensions and resolutions. Regional qualities play on the surface - wit, or tenderness, or elation. Themes and theses rear up to be contemplated.[30]

Nearly everyone will agree, he feels, that the aesthetic experience displays the following features:

> First, an aesthetic experience is one in which attention is firmly fixed upon heterogeneous but interrelated components of a phenomenally objective field - visual or

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[29] Arnheim, R., "What is Art For?", Aesthetics and Problems of Education, (ed.) Smith, R.A. University of Illinois Press, London, 1971. Page 241.

[30] Beardsley, M., The Possibility of Criticism, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1970. Page 734.

> auditory patterns, or the characters and events in literature. - - - Second, it is an experience of some intensity. Some writers have said that it is an experience pervasively dominated by intense feeling or emotion, but these terms occupy a dubious position in psychological theory; what we call emotion in an aesthetic experience may be simply the intensity of the experience itself. - - - (Thirdly) it is an experience that hangs together, or is coherent, to an unusually high degree.
>
> - - - Fourth, it is an experience that is unusually complete in itself. The impulses and expectations aroused by elements within the experience are felt to be counterbalanced or resolved by other elements within the experience, so that some degree of equilibrium or finality is achieved and enjoyed.[31]

While there is no doubt that the quality of the aesthetic experience is what we look to when we try to assess the value of a piece of art, there is a tendency for our attention to the formal elements (unity, coherence, certain "regional qualities") to lead us to overlook the fact that these formal qualities are the qualities of a treatment of a certain content. What tends to be ignored is that the experience is linked with a content which is valued in certain ways. Arnheim says that art "makes statements about reality", but many of the statements which could be made would be singularly uninteresting. Art deals with things that are matters of particular human concern, or it reveals a way of looking at something usually considered of no importance so that we come to see that there is more to it than we had been inclined to think. Trivial works could be produced which would be unified, coherent and complete, but it is not possible that they could occasion that absorption - the "experience of some intensity" which is characteristic of art. A critic identifying a great work is saying in effect that no

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[31] Beardsley, M., Aesthetics, Harcourt, Brace and Co., N.Y., 1958. Page 527.

educated man who properly understands this piece can remain unmoved.

The intensity of the experience is linked to the fact that the object is able to hold our attention. "The concentration of the experience can shut out all the negative responses - the trivial distracting noises, organic disturbances, thoughts of unpaid bills and unwritten letters and unpurged embarrassments - that so often clutter up our pleasures."[32] Now it is true that aesthetic experiences arise from natural phenomena which capture our attention so completely - sunsets, patterns in the sand, rainbows, the colours of oil on water, weathered rock and grotesque driftwood. But it is interesting that we do not slavishly imitate these things or collect, comment on and otherwise value them as we do works of art. We do not treat art works as man-made reconstructions of natural objects. Art works are of special value because they treat matters of particular human concern. The experiences which works of art make possible are considered worthy of man's attention, not just because they are pleasurable, but because they facilitate the acquisition of valued knowledge and understanding.[33] These two values ("aesthetic" and "the contribution to knowledge and understanding") are, it should be emphasised, both values which are essential to the relative worth of a piece of art as art (rather than as, perhaps, an economic proposition). Both should be present in the proper consideration of a work, and both have

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[32] Ibid. Page 528.

[33] Jenkins, I., "Aesthetic Education and Moral Refinement", Aesthetics and Problems of Education, op.cit. Jenkins does not mention "Knowledge" or "Understanding" specifically.

> "We absorb this content into our catalogs of familiarity, refer it to the subject matter from which the artist derived it, and so enrich our acquaintance with this region of life and the world." Page 194.

an important part to play in determining the logical structure within which the procedures of criticism develop.

The elements which are picked out by the second value are not logically independent of the elements picked out by aesthetic values (as may be, say, the elements picked out by this value as against economic value). Clearly the intensity with which we attend to the work is tied up with the particular human concern of the content, and its value as an experience which will facilitate the acquisition of certain knowledge and understanding is in part dependent upon such things as its coherence, unity, intensity - in short, its aesthetic quality. Thus, when we criticise works of art we attend to the way in which these elements are wedded. Yet we must justify the aesthetic value of art and the value of its contribution to knowledge and understanding in different ways.

II Art, Experience and Knowledge

Dewey pointed up the relationship between experience and knowledge and the importance of the latter to education. He also showed us the critical relationship between art and experience.[34] An understanding of these relationships seems crucial to the kinds of enterprises with which educational philosophers are concerned, and further attention to them might serve to shed light on questions of educational procedures as well as on the problem of the nature of the aesthetic mode of enquiry. The argument in this chapter would be aided considerably if the view that one of the critical values of art is the

[34] Dewey, J., Experience and Education, Collier Books, N.Y., 1938. Art as Experience, Capricorn Books, N.Y., 1934.

"facilitation of the acquisition of knowledge and understanding" is seen to have some persuasive force. The view is, however, one which needs to be looked at more closely, since it is not the kind of claim which has received much direct attention. It is more usual for philosophers to be concerned with the apparent epistemological inadequacy of art, rather than with the relationship between knowledge and the experiences which art can provide. Some attempt will be made, then, to indicate what the manner of such a "facilitation" might be.

There is a short-story by Frank Sargeson called Cow-pats which will usefully illustrate this argument.[35] It concerns a change in values which occurs in the life of a young boy. In a time of some economic difficulty (during the depression, perhaps) he and his brothers had to get up early and milk the cows. They had no boots and the ground was frosty. One of them discovered that he could warm his feet by standing in a fresh cow-pat, and soon all of them would race to warm their feet whenever a cow dropped one. The first boy there would keep the others out. Although times were hard "we didn't think we were hardly done by. As I've said, we didn't know any other sort of life".

One season he went with his mother while she had a week's rest at an uncle's hotel, and when he returned he wouldn't use cow-pats again. His brothers "reckoned I thought I'd come back from town a bit too flash for a trick like that. That wasn't the reason, though". In the mornings he had played around the entrance to the hotel, asking the porter who washed the steps

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[35] Sargeson, F., "Cow-pats", Collected Stories, Blackwood, Auckland, 1964.

why he was doing various things, and rarely getting satisfactory answers.

> Then one morning just as the porter was finishing the steps an old man came along the street and asked if he could warm his hands up in the bucket of water. The porter said, Sure, so the old man put his hands in the water and kept them there until they were warm.
>
> Well, that was something I understood without having to ask any questions. Perhaps it's stopped me from asking a good many questions in my life. I believe it's correct to say you get the best answers out of life if you don't ask any questions.
>
> Of course, after so many years I don't look at it in quite the same way. While you're alive you naturally want to keep yourself warm, and it doesn't matter much how you do it. But at that age to see an old man who might be glad of a few cow-pats to warm himself up in was somehow a bit much for me.[36]

This story moves and strangely puzzles. It moves us particularly because these two experiences are closely related and yet they conflict emotionally. Initially we come to see that the second experience can be understood in terms of the first. It has been explained in an earlier chapter of this thesis that we can understand how another person feels by imagining certain of our own experiences modified by his situation. At first sight the match between the experiences of the narrator and the old man seems so close that one would expect that the narrator may "understand" to the point of empathising. Being cold and finding such simple relief are common elements picked out by the narrator for us to notice. Both the narrator and the reader understand the second experience in terms of the first - "Well, that was something I understood without having to ask any questions".

But if we view this story as simply depicting human under-

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[36] Ibid. Page 65.

standing in terms of certain relationships between the features of two experiences, certain contradictions will remain. For when our narrator returned home "I turned up my nose at those cow-pats, and wouldn't put my feet in one no matter how cold it was". And then "after so many years I don't look at it in quite the same way. While you're alive you naturally want to keep yourself warm, and it doesn't matter much how you do it". That, we would have thought, if we were concerned to see the story as a demonstration of understanding, is exactly what the point was. It doesn't much matter how you do it, bucket of hot water or cow-pat. If he didn't see it this way at the time, then how did he see it?

While these two incidents are superficially similar, we cannot feel the same about them. The bunch of young boys in the farm yard, chasing after the cows and racing for the cow-pats, warming their feet while they fight off their brothers - it is an innocent and hilarious scene. "It was bosker and warm sure enough. Mother wasn't too shook on our doing it at first, but afterwards she didn't mind." This experience is one which is entirely self-contained. Any comparison with values from a wider world is muffled (Mother wasn't too shook on our doing it at first). It is the gambolling and scrambling of young animals, and delightful to us in its exuberance and youthful innocence. The boys are unconscious of their poverty, and so engrossed in the immediate that no awareness of the implications of the experience within the wider context of life can be detected. "As I've said, we didn't know any other sort of life." Thus we only have warrant to feel lightened by this scene. There is no element which would permit a negative or

even sobering emotional flavour to intrude.

But the incident in the second half is not hilarious, delightful, exuberant. It leads the narrator to perceive these actions of the boys in the farm yard in a different light. We can't "enjoy" this second experience which is related. It is not emotionally positive, but sobering; it "gives us pause". "I turned up my nose at those cow-pats, - - while we were staying at the hotel I'd seen something that I was holding my tongue over - - at that age to see an old man who might be glad of a few cow-pats to warm himself up in was somehow too much for me." This experience, somehow connected with the fact that the man was old, forced him to view his previous experience in a new way.

There is, therefore, much more to this story than the understanding of the old man's experience in terms of the narrator's earlier experience with cow-pats. We instantly recognise the similarity between the two, but (if we are able to attend to the thing aesthetically) we also <u>feel</u> the emotional contrast. To fail to do so is either to fail to entertain the fiction or to fail in reading at the most simple level. If we are unaware of the contrast, then the change in the boy's attitude towards the cow-pats must seem arbitrary. But the contrast between the emotional "flavour" of the two incidents contains the key to our understanding of this change, even if it is not immediately obvious.

The narrator does not really explain this change. The experience must have a strong impact on him if it is to have any point at all - he cannot easily talk about it. Sargeson's working class heroes are characteristically inarticulate, but this one makes a point of it. He had seen something to hold

his tongue over. It may have stopped him asking questions - the best answers one got out of life were not responses to questions. If we are to attempt to make his behaviour more explicitly intelligible, then, we will need to make use of whatever indirect evidence we can find. We must attempt to construct a way of viewing both the old man and the earlier experiences so as to make sense of the narrator's change in behaviour. There will, of course, be no final and authoritative way of deciding whether or not this is a correct construction since there is a limit to the data available and there are gaps which will call for guesses. Yet we can compare one such account against another in terms of easily established criteria which might be used to check such things as the internal consistency of the account and its ability to deal with all of the features of the story.

We should perhaps note that the man is old, that he is at the end of his life and struggling to meet one of the fundamental requirements of human existence - warmth. He asks if he can warm himself with a bucket of water which is being used to wash the steps of a hotel at which the boy is a guest. He must ask a younger man, a porter, a nominal servant of the boy, if he may do so. There are two dimensions of this event which are absent from the previous experience. Firstly, there is an awareness of age, and the mention of this age permits a contrast to be made with the youth of the boys. We might not be blamed for going on to note the nearness of an old man to death. At the end of his days he is at the mercy of one of the most primitive requirements for the maintenance of life and "might be glad of a few cow-pats to warm himself up in".

But there is a social dimension present in this second experience which was not there before. The porter, a servant of the boy's uncle, has no need of cow-pats, and the old man is at his mercy over the use of the water bucket. The need of the hot water betrays the old man's poverty. The porter and the boy's uncle don't need buckets of water to alleviate the cold. They are not directly chained to their raw physical environments - they are insulated and freed to pursue the more clearly human. The old man is poor, and at the end of his life is still struggling to come to terms with the demands of his animal existence. All of this the boy has seen from a vantage point somewhere near the side of his uncle and the porter. He was able to see the request for the use of the bucket through the eyes of the porter and he saw that the action was an admission of poverty and an inability to satisfactorily cope with the physical world. Thus the innocence of the use of the cow-pats was lost. From that instant he could no longer say that "we didn't think we were hardly done by - we didn't know any other sort of life". The immediacy of the cow-pats incidents was destroyed. It was now launched out into a wider world where it could be seen in terms of lifetime and poverty. It would always be possible now for the boy to see how a person, liberated from the necessity to work in bare feet and milk the cows on frosty mornings, would view such behaviour.

The boy grew up a little in that experience. The change in attitude is not just a matter of rejecting cow-pats as a means of warming feet. The experience wrought some deeper change. He had been a little boy asking the porter "what he did this that and the other thing for", just as little boys are

inclined to do. But then he saw the old man. "Well, that was something I understood without having to ask any questions. Perhaps it's stopped me asking a good many questions in my life." And when he went back to the farm he wouldn't try to explain why he stopped using cow-pats.

It needn't be claimed that the boy didn't know about poverty and age before this incident occurred. We merely need to note that the experience forced together certain sets of beliefs and values which had not previously been seen as related. New learning is made possible by the heightened attention of the occasion. It is focussed, in this instance, by the conflict of emotion arising from two seemingly similar experiences. The second experience which the boy had enabled him to gain new knowledge. As with the boy with this experience, so with us when we confront art. We experience it, and in doing so consider in a new way things we have previously believed or undergone. It is rather pointless to attempt to identify the specific pieces of knowledge we can acquire through confrontations with particular works of art. The things we learn from art may differ indefinitely from individual to individual, depending on the knowledge, beliefs and values which we bring into our experience of the work.

Having an experience is no assurance that we have acquired knowledge, of course. Any beliefs we gain from our involvement with art must have rational support before we can defend knowledge claims. But art engages our attention in the contexts of various beliefs and values and, through calling up a host of associations and in some cases employing the time dimension to apply pressure, it forces us to <u>feel</u>. It is in the course of

this attention and feeling that a work of art can expose relationships between beliefs and values which, in the ordinary course of things, we might never have noticed. Great and enduring works are remarkable for the very richness of such relationships and the diversity and subtlety of feeling with which they are accompanied. They permit us to turn to them again and again throughout our lives, or again and again throughout the ages to mine their seemingly inexhaustible wealth.

Nevertheless, although we cannot set out the specific knowledges particular people might well gain from a specific work, and hence cannot evaluate it in terms of these, critics can consider the themes to see whether the treatment is new, permitting fresh insights, or whether it is merely a reworking of what has been done so thoroughly before. They can also consider the kinds of elements which are prominent in the work as opposed to those which are not. Are these things thrown forward in such a way that we are forced to regard them differently from the ways in which we are inclined to regard them in everyday life (perhaps by being presented with certain features pared away permitting other aspects normally obscured to become more apparent; or are some features put in slightly new contexts which expose their relationships to the things which normally surround them)? And what is the value of this "different view" which the work permits? Does it point up the danger of certain clichés or otherwise illuminate important features of some other matter of considerable human interest or concern?

> Just as, without any doubt whatsoever, the painter may through his paintings train the eye of the beholder, not just to see more of his own paintings, or else of someone

> else's paintings, but apples, boulevards, clouds, a foot, rain on the ocean, and the coyness that may lurk in an old woman's eye; so may the writer of fiction train us to be more observant of human traits and of configurations of traits. At his best he is a disrupter of our stock responses ("how considerate the child is to give his brother the first bite!" "A lie is a lie." "He who hesitates is lost."), replacing them with somewhat surprising recognitions. Though reality will never be that neat, and though we be on our own (alas!), still we may now do better.[37]

Where some visual art and music are concerned, it would be necessary to pursue the line developed by Arnheim somewhat further in the light of this argument and attempt to show why there is merit in attending to the sweep of the Japanese wave. But we are concerned with literature and the knowledge of other people's feelings, and it must be demonstrated that there are valued themes in literary works, the treatment of which calls for an exploration of the feelings of characters. There is no problem here if we are prepared to acknowledge the moral content of much of literature, since if we can justify any human enquiry it is the enquiry into fitting ways for men to live.

III "Knowing How Other People Feel" and "Ethical Art"

> No novelist can achieve anything permanent without a moral basis or background.
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> Arnold Bennett, 1925.[38]

While abstract visual art concerns itself with the beliefs and values which structure the more formal elements of our visual perception, the concern of literature, and particularly the novel, the short-story and drama, is more clearly social.

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[37] Jarrett, J.L., "Coming to Know Persons, Including Oneself", Aesthetics and Problems of Education, op.cit. Page 220.

[38] Introductory Note to Gide, A., Dostoevsky, Penguin Books, 1925. Page 8.

We might go further with safety and conclude that the content of these arts is overwhelmingly ethical, if this concept is construed fairly broadly. Although artists are traditionally concerned to show us what men are like, they do not attempt to show us men in vacuo, but against a set of beliefs, ideals and assumptions. Dramatic conflict arises from a treatment of what man is like held against a conception of a universe having a particular moral structure, or, in the absence of such a structure (a chaotic, randomly ordered or malevolent universe), a conception of what is fitting for man. As a criterion of value, this "ethical" concern is one applied to an appraisal of the whole work rather than to particular regional qualities. It represents a continuous theme in art theory from Aristotle's concern for the "tragic" to later considerations of the "sublime", to the "high seriousness" and "sincerity" of more recent centuries. "High seriousness", "sincerity" and "sublimity" are terms of praise which do not, however, serve to help us pick out the particular kinds of qualities which are valued. "Tragedy" does so, but it is bound up with the heroic, which seems rather unsuitable today, and it does not assist us in our dealings with the comic or "black comic". Ethical art faces us squarely with the human struggle with the "ought".

It was clear in the case of Cow-pats that an understanding of the ethical content of the work of art was dependent upon an understanding of the feelings of the narrator. The requirement is just as urgent here as it is in those cases where we need such understanding in order to make moral decisions. In Cow-pats, we have a short-story which centres around a conception of how human beings ought to live. The theme is treated by

presenting two experiences through the eyes of one man, and since our concern is with the effect of these experiences on him we must understand how he feels, as well as what he thinks. In other cases, when a particular moral cosmology is a matter of central concern, we experience this through the actions and feelings of the characters.

For such ethical work to be possible we must be able to accept the protagonists as plausibly human. E.M. Forster has drawn our attention to the differences in literature between round and flat characters, and it is clear that, particularly in well-peopled works, extremely simple representations of characters are readily accepted.[39] Such one-dimensional characters face strict limitations in the parts they can play in the action if they are not to destroy plausibility. When the flat character who epitomizes "greed" suddenly becomes generous we cease to believe in the artist's world which suddenly appears open to arbitrary, "magical" modification (unless, of course, the point of the change rests on the particular facts about the universe in the novel - in the supernatural intervention or the employment of some sorts of hypnotism or conditioning to control behaviour).

The disturbance occasioned by such radical modification of a flat character is similar to that which exists when a stereotype is challenged in real life: we assume that there are facts we have not taken into account and we expect to be able to find them. If these facts are not revealed in the work of fiction until the radical change takes place the reader justifiably feels

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[39] Forster, E.M., Aspects of the Novel, Edward Arnold, London, 1927. Page 65.

tricked, as on those occasions when at the end of a detective story the sleuth solves the mystery by introducing a whole new body of additional information which completely restructures the character of a principal suspect. Simple characters cannot act as if out of a complex set of motives if they are to appear to readers as more than an author's puppets - they need to be "fleshed out", or become multidimensional. Clearly the underlying issue here centres upon the relationship between the ethical issue and the structure of the fictional world. Plausibility in satire makes different demands upon the nature of this fictive world than does tragedy for example. Thus a significant concern of the critic is the extent to which we can enter into the world of the work and believe that such people might exist and act in a particular way, since this participation is a necessary condition to an understanding of the ethical issues themselves.

Very frequently the world which the artist creates permits characterisations which we accept as plausible within the "world" of the work, but which we would not very readily accept in the world we live in. In Heller's Catch-22, Colonel Cathcart and Milo Minderbinder are extravagant military characters who would stand out incongruously in a world which did not support their behaviour. But apart from the waves of sanity in Yossarian, the "world" of Catch-22 is an insane world. Minderbinder and Cathcart are extreme stereotypes or caricatures, but they are like this because it was Heller's wish to thrust us face-to-face with the incipient insanity of communities at war - particularly military ones. Such exaggeration and caricature is needed to force us through the set of supporting

beliefs which surround the military establishment so that we see Heller's point.[40]

Great Expectations is an interesting example of a novel in which an elaborate thematic construction organises the fortunes of a host of characters but, seemingly because of the demands of characterisation, fails to achieve a satisfactory aesthetic conclusion. This work measures the effects of two sets of values on the life of the narrator in terms of the people who are bound up with his destiny and who are instrumental in creating his expectations of wealth and position, or those who remain untouched by them. This "progress" of Pip's occurs against certain conceptions of "crime", "guilt" and "justice". The relationships between the characters are built upon a mass of coincidences in the interests of the theme - coincidences which would be implausible outside the world of the novel. These coincidental relationships are forged into a tightly bound structure so that character stands out against character. Magwitch the convict adopts Pip and makes him a gentleman. Miss Havisham adopts Estella and brings her up to break men's hearts (she breaks Pip's). Miss Havisham and Magwitch are linked by Campeyson, the gentleman who commits crimes against them both. They are linked again through Estella who is Magwitch's daughter. Pip is linked to Miss Havisham, since she leads him to believe that she is the source of his expectations. Magwitch and Miss Havisham are further linked by the same lawyer (Jaggers), a fact which encourages Pip's false belief in the source of his expectations. When all is revealed, and Pip's expectations crumble about him he attempts to return to the Eden

[40]Heller, J., Catch-22, Corgi Books, London, 1962.

which he left - Joe and Biddy and the forge. This return of the prodigal is, Millhauser has pointed out, a suitable point for concluding the ethical theme. But Pip is too much changed to become a village blacksmith.

> Dickens must have felt the situation was one that cannot be handled gracefully. Pip loves Joe loyally, but he has little to say to him; more importantly, perhaps, he has no need of him, now that he is neither a child nor ill. He is no longer a snob, but he has become habituated to another world. He actually has more in common with that amiable nonentity Herbert Pocket, whom accordingly he joins for the next eight years or so, and to whom, with or without Estella, he will presumably return. The difference, the decisive difference, between Joe (who carries off all the moral honours) and Herbert, is one of background, breeding, interests, class. (Herbert was fond of Handel; Joe thundered out "Old Clem".)[41]

Thus the Prodigal Son becomes the Industrious Apprentice - he goes to work with Herbert in Cairo. "The one good thing he did in his prosperity, the only thing that endures and bears good fruit." But Millhauser finds this section "dry", "remote", "shadowy" - in contrast to the richness of the novel up to that point and in spite of the fact that they deal with a "firming" of Pip's character and permit something further to be done about Pip's relationship with Estella. Perhaps this section was

> a convenient way out of certain difficulties. As a plot expedient, it functions effectively: it separates Pip from Joe and Biddy, who might otherwise prove awkward to deal with; it permits him to meet Estella after a long period during which each has matured through a series of disappointments, efforts, and morally enlightening experiences. But it is not <u>used</u> - merely mentioned.[42]

This section of <u>Great Expectations</u> carries us on, then, to

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[41] Millhauser, M., "Great Expectations: The Three Endings", <u>Dickens Studies Annual</u>, vol. 2, (ed.) Partlow, R.B. Jr. Southern Illinois University Press, 1972. Page 272.

[42] <u>Ibid</u>. Page 273.

that famous final scene of which we have two versions. In the first of these, Dickens

> stands at a little distance and views the scene by a cool grey light. The reason is clear enough, - - Dickens had far less than usual to offer his readers in the way of wedding bells and pink rosettes; that harsh reality, Estella's predatory heart, had been insisted on too urgently to make any promise of redemption convincing. - - - The scene is handled rapidly and quietly, "away from all such things as they conventionally go," as though to suggest stylistically that it is no more than a comment on an already completed tale.[43]

The second ending is generally considered to be even less satisfactory. "'The patched-on second ending,' says Ross H. Dabney, 'is a great mistake.' And so it is: 'false in substance and tone,' a concession to romantic convention and, Dabney thinks, to class sentiment." Millhauser sees both endings as a formal requirement in the novel of the age rather than one demanded by psychological or thematic necessity. "The hero of the novel, however unheroic he may be, cannot interest himself in a young lady, however unangelic, without finding himself committed to a climactic sentimental exchange with her as the novel ends."[44] It is impossible to leave Pip at "the return to the forge" because of the sort of person Pip has become, and yet at that point the essential elements of the theme have been resolved. The first version of the ending adds nothing and is irrelevant. Any attempt at a resolution with Estella must fail, however, because it must be a reward for Pip, fulfilling his "expectations". And it would, of course, force a sudden new dimension into Estella's character at a most awkward point. Her vengeance upon men is too central and vital to be lightly thrown away.

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid. Page 274.

But the demands of the theme are not the only ones which force our understanding of characters in literature to be different from our understanding of people in everyday life. For, although it is true that we must enter their experiencing of their world, it is not true that we always do this as we do in real life. Cow-pats and Great Expectations are examples of works which provide us with knowledge in much the same manner as we might gain it in everyday life - that is, through a first-person account. But let us consider one of the greatest ethical dramas - Macbeth. Here we have a play concerning a man whose ambition leads him to choose to cut across the grain of the moral order of the universe and, realising that there could be no wiping out of the sin or turning back from the inevitable failure and death, resolutely carries on. The theme of the play is the wiping out of this crime against the moral order, and it is to be experienced largely through Macbeth's perception of his desires and the significance of what he has done and will do. Our participation in his experience is, however, not restricted to the kinds of events from which we can work out people's feelings in everyday life. Macbeth soliloquizes frequently, and employs language rich in imagery and with great power to move. These features of the character's behaviour are "not natural", but, through drawing on associations called up by imagery and through articulating thoughts which would not usually be revealed, serve to catch us up in his mental life.

> Come, seeling night,
> Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day,
> And with thy bloody and invisible hand
> Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond
> Which keeps me pale! Light thickens, and the crow

Makes wing to the rooky wood;
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse,
Whiles night's black agents to their preys do rouse.[45]

Only superficially does this describe a time of day. In the context of the play this passage expresses a state of mind. Yet if we consider the passage in the light of our everyday experience it seems improbable that a man would stop to describe his feelings of the moment in such a fashion. "Seeling" night, "scarfing", "tender" eyes (of day), "bloody and invisible hands" (of night), "light thickening", "crows", "rooky woods", "night's black agents", "preys" - these words draw on associations which are part of basic human experiences and they are orchestrated so that we are forced through feelings supposedly akin to the ones expressed.

Thus there are certain characteristics of literary art which make the critic's task in coming to know the feelings of characters a somewhat different matter from our task of knowing how a person feels in everyday life. On the one hand the logical limit to the acquisition of further facts is drawn differently in literature. If Jane is said to be tall and blond and blue-eyed it is normally logically odd to question this unless there is some narrative point concerning the falsity of statements in the work. Similarly, it makes no sense to try and verify the statement by trying to find Jane or someone who has met her. On the other hand, we are often provided with vastly more information in certain respects than is available to us ordinarily. When eye-of-God, or interior monologue techniques are employed we can actually "enter" other minds.

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[45]Act III, Scene II.

It is apparent, then, that in the performance of his task of making clear the concerns embodied in a work and showing us how it should appropriately be viewed, a literary critic must have recourse to the kinds of evidence and procedures we employ in coming to know how other people feel in everyday life. It is equally plain, however, that since the concerns of literary works are rarely confined merely to psychological studies, and since our means of access to literary worlds and the structure of the worlds themselves frequently differ from our everyday experience in important respects, it will be necessary to consider our own particular educational interests in the light of this discussion of literature and criticism.

CHAPTER VI : EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

We are now in a position to consider the claim that there is no incompatibility between the use of literature to develop the ability to understand the feelings of others and the requirements of a literary education. The task of the critic is to show us how a piece of literature should be read in order that it be satisfactorily understood (that is, he must attempt to set out a reasonable description and interpretation of the literary work). He must also assess the value of the work in terms of those features of the world which it highlights, and in terms of the manner in which these things are highlighted. One of the purposes of a literary education is to enable pupils to carry out these tasks for themselves.

When critics perform their descriptive and interpretive tasks on those works of literature in which the feelings of characters are important (as in much ethical art), they must often employ the same procedures as those which we employ in everyday life when we wish to know how other people feel. In order to understand how to appraise many works, particularly those written in some other age, critics must be able to conceive how the work would be viewed if their own beliefs were quite different. It is no accident that an important debate in recent aesthetics is concerned with a question of belief very similar to one dealt with in Chapter III. T.S. Eliot, in a crucial essay on Dante's Divine Comedy, raised the question of whether one could be a non-Catholic and yet fully understand the work.[46] Presumably a Catholic would be able to believe in

[46] Eliot, T.S., "Dante", Selected Essays, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1932. Page 257.

the world represented in the work while other readers would not. The latter would have to content themselves with imagining what it would be like to believe. This raised other questions. Is it sufficient to be a modern Catholic or must one be a Catholic of the Renaissance before one can "fully" understand the work? If the Catholic has an advantage is it merely that he has more facts at his disposal? Presumably to feel what the Renaissance critic felt when he read the work we must believe certain things about the universe which he would have believed, just as to feel the emotion that any other man feels we must believe what he believes. It is impossible for most of us to hold the beliefs about the universe which structure the Renaissance man's appraisal of the Divine Comedy. Hence it cannot be the same work of art for us as it was for him. Nevertheless, our understanding of the work is governed by our attempt to work out how the world of the work would seem if we believed those things which Dante could assume that his readers believed. (An understanding of these things may, for example, be vital to an understanding of how the characters see their world.) This is similar to the case where we work out what another man feels. But if we do not hold the same beliefs about the object (of art or of an emotion) as the other man we will never experience it as he does.

Thus the appropriate response to a work of literature depends upon the recognition that certain beliefs about the world of the work are to be taken as true. The implications of this may be very complex when we begin to consider how the characters behave in these works. Should their actions and emotions be seen as reasonable in the light of the manner in

which their "world" is ordered? Readers must learn how to penetrate into the behaviour of central characters to unravel these things. A satisfactory understanding of a work will not be possible unless they are able to do so. A critic must, in the course of his training, learn those procedures which will permit him to work out what it would be like to hold the beliefs held by a particular group of readers or (which is more to our point) by individual characters. Since these procedures are the same, in many cases, as those we use in everyday life, there is no incompatibility here between the interests of a literary education and the suggestion that we use literature to develop in pupils the ability to understand how other people feel.

A facility with these procedures constitutes only a relatively small part of the repertoire which a critic must develop, however, and a literary education would still be threatened by moral educators if this interest began to displace attention given to other facets of literary study. We must strive for a literary balance of material when we are selecting works for literary study in schools, therefore, and seek out works particularly valuable for the development of this ability when the requirements of a literary education warrant it. Nevertheless, works of literature could clearly be used for this purpose in other parts of the educational programme without detriment to the interests of literature.

But if this is the case why bother about using "literature" as such at all, except as it appropriately arises in the course of literary study? Are there not works of fiction which have little literary merit but which might be better for our purposes? The answer to this question should follow from the account of

literature which has been given in the previous chapter. We judge the worth of a piece of literature by its aesthetic value and by the value of the knowledge we can gain from it through having our attention drawn to particular features of the world. The aesthetic value is derived from the quality of the experience: these important and valued aspects of the world are "impressed" upon us. Clearly, to judge a work of fiction which deals with the feelings of people as effective is to make a literary judgement according to such criteria. It has been argued that the features of our world which are picked out by works of literature are often valued for the ethical insights they permit (if "ethical" is construed fairly broadly) but this is not a necessary condition: it merely reflects our preoccupation with ethical matters. If a work dealt only with the feelings of others but did so very effectively it would be judged according to the same criteria. Works which deal only with the feelings of others are, however, somewhat rare, yet "ethical art" frequently demands a treatment of the feelings of protagonists in the interests of its themes.

Suppose, then, that someone was to claim that a certain book, although poor on literary grounds, would nevertheless help young people to understand a certain emotion better than would a "good" book because, through its crude, gross and unsubtle execution, it would enable immature readers to obtain a simple insight into an emotion otherwise inaccessible in a sophisticated treatment. Such a work might "hammer home" a very crude stereotype for readers who lack even the simplest means of identifying beliefs characteristic of a particular appraisal. It should be clear, however, that to use such an argument is to

be concerned with the literary criteria and the dependence of these on certain pedagogical matters where children's literature is concerned, for it is to suggest that the experience of this work is more accessible to the immature than are other more worthwhile experiences. When we are concerned with literary education we must take account of the fact that accessibility to literary experience is dependent upon relative maturity. The only justification for choosing this crude, unsubtle book over other works is that although the others permit more sophisticated understanding, even a very simple understanding will not be possible for the immature. If we have several books, each of which can in fact be appreciated by the young reader, we will choose between them on the basis of such criteria as the accuracy with which the emotion is represented and the force of its presentation. The better book (given that all are equally forceful) will be the one which, though greatly simplified, is built upon the most sophisticated interpretive schemes and is hence the least misleading. Thus, if there are no particular educational reasons for preferring one book to another, it is always better for the development of the ability with which we are concerned if works which are of considerable literary merit are used in preference to works which are not.

Criteria for selecting books for the immature must include certain pedagogical considerations even when our concern is exclusively with a literary education. Suitable works need to be scrutinized to see that they do not contain language or vocabulary which is too sophisticated or archaic for pupils to understand what the work is about, or that the feelings and situations with which they deal are not so far distanced from

the experience of the readers as to be incomprehensible. There is no point in presenting preadolescents with sophisticated and subtle works which treat adult love (treatments, that is, which call for sophisticated understanding), simply because they will not have developed sufficiently to make much of the mental states as they are presented. This is not to say that children should not be exposed to themes from this general region of human behaviour, but merely that the treatment which is suitable for a nine-year-old is not the treatment which is suitable for an educated adult. What is required for the nine-year-old is the fullest possible understanding of the feelings of the characters in the light of the experience he has available and in terms of the procedures discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis, with the proviso that the literary encounter will not be one which will reduce his willingness to engage in further literary study.

Lack of certain experiences may also mean that pupils are unable to respond to works of literature appropriately. There would be no point in presenting a pupil with the quotation from Macbeth which was used in the previous chapter (Come, seeling night - -) if he lacked the tradition which would enable him to associate such things as crows and rooky woods with such other things as witchcraft, night and death. Fortunately, these associations are probably almost universal, yet it is not inconceivable that such associations might be lacking and in some cases the kind of lack may mean that the literary experience is inaccessible. All sorts of experiences, then, from comic-books to forests at night, may have a part in ensuring that literary works have the necessary aesthetic effect, and again

the educator must judge that the pupils have had a minimum of experiences to enable the work to be of value to them.

Thus the task of criticising literature for the young introduces considerations from the domains of educational philosophy and developmental psychology with which literary critics do not normally have to contend. A literary critic as a rational enquirer depends upon his own cultivated sensibilities and the careful self-examination of these in order to determine what the experience of a particular work has to offer sophisticated seekers of truth. This stance permits him to consider the value of children's literature in a similar manner. But children's literature is literature for the immature: for the unsophisticated seeker of aesthetic experience and truth. The critic must "put himself in the place" of the intended audience and attempt to evaluate the experiences which he could reasonably expect of readers of a given level of immaturity. This problem is compounded by the fact that immature readers cannot be asked to go to the lengths that might be expected of sophisticated students in the pursuit of the experiences a work has to offer. It may take several readings and much analysis before the riches of a complex adult work begin to be revealed. Readers who are committed to the pursuit of knowledge often must anticipate dreary hours of reading material they do not understand, as well as extensive related reading to enable them to construct appropriate appraisals. They hope for some new insight to be won from their long investigation, or else that their present experience will be refined, but such hopes cannot be expected in young readers who have not yet been initiated into the values and procedures of this form of thought. Children's literature

must, therefore, capture the attention of children rather readily, and critics of children's works must somehow take this into consideration - hence the expanding body of empirical work on the reading preferences of children.

Clearly there is a considerable difference between deciding which experiences are of value to man, as must a critic of adult works, and deciding what experiences are of value to children, as must the critic of children's literature. Valuable experiences will, obviously enough, be limited to those which will further initiation into the rational forms of thought and modes of experience, yet if we look at this requirement more closely we can see that some conflicts may arise. We have to eliminate experiences which may be detrimental to children in view of the degree to which they are not fully rational since, as a consequence, they will be more open to irrational persuasion, suggestion, or may in other ways be more "impressionable" than rational adults are. Although we may wonder about the value of Plato's criticism of the effects of immorality in literature where works for people who are rational are considered, we cannot deny the force of the argument where the young are concerned (and Plato's interest was, after all, in education). But we are left in something of a dilemma if, while being aware that there is such a danger, we are not as sure as Plato how the right choices should be made.

Let us consider an actual case. In the October 1970 issue of Elementary English, Sheldon Root Jr. reviewed Don't Play Dead Before You Have To by Maia Wojciechowska. This is a book which might be read by fifth and sixth graders and concerns a boy by the name of Byron who is baby-sitter, teacher and companion for

another named Charlie. The construction and execution of this work comes in for considerable praise, as does much of the content. "There are those among us who will reject the book due to the negative image of the school. Because it hurts. And it hurts because it is in such a large measure true!" But there are three questions which trouble the reviewer. First, Byron is a compulsive swearer. "It cannot be denied that the use of such language is an effective attention gaining device. Whether or not it is to be condoned is quite a different matter." It should be noted that this criticism of the language does not seem concerned with artistic necessity.

> But, two questions remain to be resolved before arriving at a tentative evaluation of the book.
>
> First, will the reader fathom the depths of the changes that take place in Byron? Must the searching questions that Byron asks be so violently cast against a society that is made to appear so obviously corrupt? Isn't the young reader apt to take unto himself the early Byron and not understand that Byron has worked things out within the existing framework?
>
> My reaction is, no! Kids are living in a world that comes to grips with them, even if they don't want to come to grips with it. They <u>will understand</u> the changes in Byron as they take place <u>and they will find satisfaction</u> in knowing that someone, at least, has made some headway toward resolving his problems.[47]

Here, then, we have an attempt to imagine how children will appraise the work, and to decide whether or not the correct appraisal is too difficult for them to manage.

> Second, do the author's ends justify her means? Isn't the entire relationship between Charlie and Byron too unhealthy to portray in a book for young readers?
>
> My reaction to this question is more ambivalent. From all appearances, Charlie was Byron's lay psychiatrist.

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[47] Root, S. Jr., "Books for Children", <u>Elementary English</u>, vol. XLVII, October 1970. Page 852.

> Because of Charlie, Byron was able to work through his hang-ups. But is the reverse equally true? Might Charlie not have been far better off had there not been a Byron? If this is true, is it acceptable in children's books to portray such a use of one individual by another?
>
> I think not!
>
> Whether or not the young reader will interpret the relationship this way, I do not yet know. I do intend to find out. - - If young readers see Byron as Charlie's salvation, then I will gladly reverse my tentatively held conclusion.
>
> I am quite sure that Maia Wojciechowska did not intend to portray Byron as a parasite.[48]

It seems that Root considers it to be somewhat of an open question as to whether Byron should be seen as a parasite or not, but the point is that if he is seen as a parasite then Root feels that this may be a bad thing because he wonders if it is "acceptable in children's books to portray such a use of one individual by another". Presumably this is because impressionable ten and eleven-year-olds might identify with Byron and be led to imitate this use of others, since they are not yet capable of objectively evaluating what Byron is doing to Charlie in terms of overriding moral imperatives. Bad people are very common in highly praised children's literature, however, so there must be some way in which writers can treat characters who do bad things without having their works incur the disfavour of critics such as Root. The danger here may be that Byron is the hero whose personality dominates the work. Since he does not seem to be aware that he might be using Charlie and since he does not appear to suffer any consequences of this undesirable behaviour, it might appear that it is condoned. There would seem to be two ways of preventing this from happening in children's works. We could make it unlikely that readers would

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[48] Ibid.

identify with characters who do bad things by keeping their characterisation "flat" and "shadowy". If their motives seem clearly malicious and we cannot see how we might feel like that in similar circumstances, then we are unlikely to identify with them. This would be helped if the hero is "good" and characterised sufficiently richly to make identification with him more likely. The other solution would be to ensure that characters in children's fiction who do bad things "get their deserts". Heroes should see the error of their ways and feel remorse. Villains should be confronted with their sins and helped to reform. The agents of such an education can either be "wise" men or "chance" events which occur in the world of the work to show that you cannot be bad and get away with it.

We must take account of this view. Pupils might acquire undesirable attitudes through identifying with bad characters. In practice it is questionable whether we know enough about what goes on in children's minds to be able to formulate sound rules to help us judge whether critical judgements such as the ones Sheldon Root has made are in fact justified. In what circumstances will such an identification overturn a value held with a particular strength? What is required before a person can separate the consideration of the morality of another person's acts from his personal appeal, and at what stage can we decide that young people are able to do this? What are the effects of the various contexts in which the work is read? What is the effect of reading a work which projects undesirable values as one among many similar works; as one among works projecting a variety of different values; or as a work read under adult supervision (and what are the effects of different kinds of

supervision)? This last is of particular importance since we may assume that aesthetic and moral education require the participation of teachers who are advanced in moral and aesthetic matters. Where aesthetic education is concerned pupils must learn to understand works better so that their responses can be enhanced and refined. In the case which has been discussed, it might be important for the pupils to consider the extent to which Byron uses Charlie. This would permit a consideration (beyond the concerns of criticism but within the bounds of moral education) of whether or not one should act as Byron has acted. We really know very little about the factors involved in any of these questions.

It is important to take note of some of the very real difficulties which might arise from the use of this kind of criticism. First there is the danger of selecting too severely, of imposing a value system by eliminating anything which makes a case for particular values other than those we hold. This may still be bad, even when we are convinced that the values which we are supporting can be justified. Whether the values are rational or not, by eliminating some we may close off value questions which should, in the interests of the later rational development of the pupils, remain somewhat open. The second danger is that a concern for ensuring that the right values are promoted against the wrong ones may mean that children are systematically misled by fictional worlds which differ consistently from the real world which they will increasingly encounter. When they find out that in real life the bad man sometimes does "get away with it" (using other people?) without so much as a twinge of the conscience, and that some people who

are doing wrong cannot be brought to recognise it, and even that virtuous men sometimes fail, pitifully and ignobly, they may come to reject fiction as false escapism, since in one sense it will not only have failed to help them to accommodate to the world but will have actually led them astray. This is not an argument against fantasy in children's literature, nor is it an argument against fictional worlds which are morally ordered in a particular way, but it is an argument for a balance in the literary fare we present to children.

A third danger is that we may handicap children in their attempts to come to understand people who represent values we don't condone. If bad people are always presented in a shadowy fashion in children's literature, then children will be presented with a disproportionate amount of material helping them to understand the feelings of people who do right things as against the people who do wrong. Similarly, if the fates must always turn against bad characters to purge them of their crimes, then children's literature will either have to ignore important features of many moral situations or else the plots of works which deal with these situations will have to take implausible twists. It has been stated elsewhere that "in real life the difficulty is usually even to see the point of wicked, cruel, stupid or malicious behaviour".[49] Yet in our attempts to behave morally it is often vital that we understand what led a person to behave wickedly or maliciously, even though our sympathies will be more likely to move to people victimised by such behaviour. We may have difficulty translating our PHIL

[49] Gribble, J. and Oliver, R.G., "Empathy and Education", op.cit. Page 19.

principle into action because we more readily understand what it is to suffer the malice or viciousness of others than we understand what brings a person to the point of being malicious or vicious. Hence we may seriously weaken the capacity of children to make adequate moral judgements by providing them with a literary content which might promote this imbalance.

It is clear, therefore, that the literary critic and the moral educator face a formidable task when they attempt to select literature which will help pupils to understand how other people feel. They must not only consider certain complex requirements which the pupil's particular stages of development will impose on any literary selection, but they must also consider the suitability of literature in terms of its capacity to facilitate this knowledge of others. There are two aspects of this facilitation which should be considered. First, there is the matter of creating and elaborating stereotypes and interpretive schemes, and second, there is the use of works of literature to develop procedures for considering primary and secondary facts and reconstructing appraisals.

Special attention might well be given to crucial but pernicious stereotypes which any particular group of pupils might hold. All literature would, of course, be presented with the intention of enhancing the understanding of the feelings of particular people yet in some cases it may be necessary to give special attention to breaking down deeply entrenched and limiting stereotypes - the Negro, the Jew, or the unemployed, for example. Other groups which will deserve special attention are those with whom people have constant dealings but from whom they differ substantially in experience, beliefs, and values as well as in

physical development. Paramount among these must be questions of age and sex, and certain important roles such as parenthood. These literary experiences must be chosen not only with an eye to the kinds of feelings represented but also with attention to the manner of presentation. Understanding of these experiences will be enhanced when analogies are established with experiences the pupils have already had. This is very demanding of writers of children's literature since richness of experience and language are lacking where the young are concerned.

We can all think of famous stereotypes which we have acquired from literature - the masculine Hemingway hunter, Kipling's ex-public school adventurer-soldier, Shaw's inspired, insightful and rational women, Wilde's young men of wit and studied indolence. And we all have our collection of colourful individuals who mark off extreme "types" for us - the Fagins, the Pumblechooks, the Jimmy Porters. But the most fruitful characters are those like Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment who not only provide us with "types" but, as fully "rounded" characters, have been investigated in such depth that they illuminate the nature of emotion itself. Shakespeare provides us with some of the best examples - Macbeth, Othello, Hamlet, Richards II and III. The more characters we confront who feel emotions falling under one concept, but arising out of different beliefs and values and in the contexts of different cultures and sub-cultures, the more we will be exposed to the richness of behaviour required if we are to develop comprehensive interpretive schemes. The privileged status which authors often grant to narrators to enable them to show us the mental events of characters more directly than would be possible from complete

descriptions of observable behaviour permits us to more accurately identify an emotion than would often be the case in everyday life. Because of this the relationship fundamental to interpretive schemes - that which exists between an emotion and its manifestation in behaviour - is more clearly available for observation.

When we consider what can be done with literature by way of preparing pupils to seek the facts and reconstruct the appraisals which determine particular emotions we must take account of the way in which the facts occur in works of fiction. Some of the facts which are made available through the peculiar stance of the narrator (eye-of-God, or the employment of "interior monologue" or "flashback" techniques) could never be available in real life. In addition, a very large part of the "art" of producing effective fiction is in the guidance we receive from the careful selection of facts which are important.

> One of the things one has to learn about reading literature is to attend to the details as probably significant in having been selected for mention. If in real life a companion is while talking playing with a letter opener, chances are we pay it little mind; in a story or a play, we would almost certainly register this fact as significant: combined with other mannerisms such behaviour enables us to "know" the character. The configuration of traits <u>is</u> the character, and one of the things we sometimes commend in the "skillful and perceptive portrayal of character" is the economy of his selection: by the mention of only a handful of qualities, he has seemed to put us in the presence of a person both distinctive and credible. It may be a very flat character, say a serving maid who responds to both praise and scolding with "I do my best, mum," and yet this little refrain may be used so tellingly that we feel there really is little else to the person than what has been thus revealed. Or the character may be subtle, profound, possessed of deep feelings, played upon by dark, unconscious forces; though this portrayal will doubtless take more time and space, its economy may be even more impressive, our conclusion being that the character has infinite, inexhaustible resources.[50]

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[50] Jarrett, J.L., <u>op.cit</u>. Page 220.

So to the extent that it is possible at all in fiction, finding out how characters feel is easier than it is in real life. There are clearly limitations, then, to the abilities literature may enable us to develop. The facts are not so readily available in real life, and we are not so clearly guided to the important facts. These are limitations, but what of the advantages of the nature of characterisation in literature?

Although literature does not confront us with quite the same problem that we are confronted with in everyday life - the problem of deciding which bits of behaviour are relevant in our attempt to work out what another person feels - we are presented with examples of disposition-feeling-behaviour relationships from which irrelevant and distracting bits of information have been removed. Hence, although such examples will not provide instances which will make demands identical to those of "real life" situations, they permit an insight into the structure of beliefs, values and appraisals, and facilitate the establishment of analogies which would not otherwise be possible. Literature has the power to draw our attention to the details of a situation which, in real life, we would not otherwise have noticed. In novels this may be achieved through detailed description, but perhaps the best illustration comes from film-making where cameramen force us to attend to the slightest change in facial expression by zooming in so that the face fills the screen. Literature is an ideal material for this aspect of education, then, even if it will not do the complete job.

There is very little that can be said here about the actual manner in which a teacher might proceed to develop the ability of pupils to reconstruct appraisals. Where the

literature permits it, it will be possible to use it to develop a number of aspects of appraisal-construction. From the evidence which can be found where beliefs and values are concerned, and from what are perceived to be the facts of the situation in which the emotion arises, the basic structure of the appraisal can be assembled. By employing the assumption of the coherence of appraisals, reasonable conjectures can be made respecting beliefs and values for which direct evidence is lacking. And the resultant reconstruction can be verified against the descriptions of the occurrent experience of the feeling. But the manner of proceeding will be determined by the nature of the literature, the maturity of the pupils and the requirements of the concept of "education" itself.

This thesis has been an attempt to analyse what is involved in coming to know how other people feel (since this ability is necessary for a man to be able to act morally in many situations) and to show what part literature can legitimately play in an educational programme intended to develop this ability. It has been made clear, however, that there are problems in any such use of literature in educational programmes, and that literary experience cannot reproduce some important elements of situations in which we confront people experiencing feelings. Other areas of enquiry have a considerable amount to offer educators who wish to develop this ability, and the possible contributions of these fields also calls for investigation. An important one of these is social science, and another is history. Techniques in these disciplines permit us to analyse systems of beliefs and values and provide frameworks which will facilitate the reconstruction of appraisals.

Literary critics have long used such things as Freudian theory and the findings of historical investigations wherever these may help them to understand the emotional experiences of characters. Nevertheless, the philosophy of art deserves more attention from educational philosophers. There is a real urgency, not only to work out more carefully how children's literature should be criticised, but to look more closely at the ways in which literature might be taught. Analyses of the logic of criticism have only recently been able to break away from a preoccupation with what might be called "aestheticism" or matters of "taste"; a preoccupation which still predominates in the public view of art, and which confuses much of the treatment which art is given in schools. We must, through our educational philosophy, demonstrate in more detail how the experience of art serves to illuminate the "human condition".

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